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ABSTRACT
Background: In Bangladesh, on an average 62% of total healthcare spending was 
borne by households through out-of-pocket (OOP) payments annually during 2000-
2015. Because of such high OOP payments, a sizable proportion of households 
(15.7%) faced catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) and a number of them fell into 
poverty in 2010. Protecting households from such payments and consequently, the 
risk of impoverishment are desirable objectives of health systems worldwide. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) resolution emphasized ensuring quality 
and affordable essential health services through Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
by 2030. In order to achieve UHC, the World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mends to ensure the protection against the risk of large healthcare payments or 
CHE by spreading the risk among the population through pre-payments e.g., tax, 
social security contribution, insurance premium. Informal workers in the agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sectors including readymade garments (RMG) workers 
constitute a large proportion of the total labor force (88%), who contribute to 64% 
of the total Gross Domestic Products of Bangladesh. Efforts should, therefore, be 
made to ensure sustainable quality healthcare for this group of workers by bring-
ing them under pre-payment health schemes. Community-Based health insurance 
(CBHI) and employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) schemes were thus piloted 
among selected informal workers with an aim to increase utilization of medically 
trained healthcare providers (MTPs) at an affordable price.
Objectives: The main objective of this dissertation is twofold: firstly, to study the 
effect of the current healthcare financing system on the financial risk of households 
and secondly, to explore potential solutions through pre-payments schemes (CBHI 
and ESHI) for mitigating such challenges.
Methods: Based on both primary and/or secondary data, five studies were con-
ducted. In study I, nationally representative Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey, 2016 has been used which provide data on household consumption 
expenditure including health expenses. We calculated the incidence of CHE, 
which was later predicted by demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
of the households using multiple regression analysis. The incidence of CHE was 
defined as the proportion of households having healthcare expenditure of more 
than a threshold level such as 10% of their total consumption expenditure or 40% 
of their non-food consumption expenditure. We estimated the impoverishment 
effect of OOP payments using both the national (cost of basic need approach) and 
the international (1.90 International dollar per person per day) poverty line. For 
study II, 557 informal workers were surveyed during 2010-11 in three geographic 
locations (a metropolitan city, a district town and a sub-district area) to estimate 
the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CBHI, using the contingent valuation method. 
The association between WTP and demographic characteristics was measured 
by employing the log-normal regression model. Study III adopted a case-control 
design to estimate the effect of the CBHI scheme on healthcare utilization from 
MTPs. We, therefore, surveyed 1,292 (646 insured and 646 uninsured) house-
holds after 1 year of implementation of the scheme. In order to minimise the 
unobserved baseline differences between the insured and uninsured groups, a 
propensity score matching was performed. A multilevel logistic regression model 
was applied to measure the association between MTP healthcare use and CBHI 
membership, in comparison to uninsured. Using the same design in study IV, a 
two-part regression model was applied to assess the relationship between CBHI 
membership and the OOP expenditure (probability and magnitude) when adjusted 
for other confounding factors (demographic and socio-economic). Study V utilized 
a case-control design with cross-sectional pre-and post-intervention surveys 
among workers from 7 purposely selected RMG factories (6 intervention and 1 
comparison factories) in Safipur of Gazipur, Bangladesh.  Randomly selected RMG 
workers were interviewed in pre-(October 2013) and post-intervention phases 
(April 2015) from insured and uninsured RMG factories. In total, 1,924 workers 
were interviewed (480 from the insured group and 482 from the uninsured group 
in pre- and post-intervention periods). We estimated the difference-in-difference 
(DiD) of the utilization of healthcare and OOP expenditure. The DiD is a counter-
factual estimate derived by measuring the change in outcomes in the intervention 
group, which is deducted from the change in outcomes in the comparison group 
between the pre- and post-intervention periods. Beside DiD estimation, we used 
a two-part regression model to measure the association between OOP payments 
and membership of the ESHI scheme while controlling for workers’ demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics.
Results: Study I found that CHE were faced by 24.6% of households at the 10% 
threshold level, the incidence was 25.3% and 22.0% among the poorest and the 
richest households, respectively. The poverty rate rose by 5.5% (9.0 million individu-
als) due to OOP payments. In study II, we observed that approximately 87% of the 
informal workers were willing to pay for the CBHI. The average weekly WTP was 
22.8 BDT [95% confidence interval (CI): 20.9–24.8] or 0.32 USD. Monthly income, 
occupation, geographic location and educational level were the main determinants 
of WTP. Study III suggested that the insured of CBHI were 2.111 (95% CI: 1.458-
3.079) times more likely than uninsured to use MTP for healthcare. Applying the 
two-part regression model in study IV, we found that in comparison with the unin-
sured, the average OOP payment was 6.4% (p<0.001) smaller among the insured 
for such healthcare utilization. Nonetheless, no significant difference was observed 
in OOP payments for the health service utilization from all types of providers, i.e., 
both MTPs and non-trained providers though the latter one was not included in 
the benefit package of the scheme. Study V showed that the ESHI scheme has 
resulted in a significant 26.1% escalation in the  utilization of healthcare (DiD=26.1; 
p<0.01) from MTPs among the insured relative to uninsured. When accounting 
for covariates, such utilization fell to 18.4% (p<0.05). The DiD calculation showed 
that OOP spending for insured group decreased by -3,700 BDT and -1,100 BDT 
in comparison to uninsured group while utilized MTPs or all types of providers 
respectively, although not statistically significant.
Conclusions: Reliance on OOP payments for healthcare leads to financial hard-
ship and a challenge for securing financial protection to achieve UHC in low- and 
middle-income country settings with a large informal sector, like in Bangladesh. 
To mitigate the challenge of healthcare utilization at lower OOP payments, prep-
payment schemes such as CBHI and ESHI, are useful for increasing utilization of 
healthcare from MTPs by both informal and RMG workers. These schemes are 
in considerable demand that was supported by the WTP findings. However, the 
insured of the CBHI scheme had a significantly lower OOP payment, while worker 
insured by ESHI did not experience such reduction. Broader healthcare provider 
networks of ESHI schemes would reduce dependency on external providers (not 
contracted by ESHI) and consequently reduce OOP payments while increasing 
utilization of services. 
In summary, the studies in this dissertation describe the challenges of the current 
healthcare financing system in Bangladesh and the substantial potential of CBHI and 
ESHI schemes to mitigate such challenges among the informal and RMG workers. 
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11 BACKGROUND
1.1 Universal Health Coverage in Bangladesh-  
progress and challenges
Bangladesh has achieved remarkable success in delivering primary healthcare 
services, such as immunization, which has significantly reduced maternal and child 
mortality rates (Balabanova et al., 2013). Nevertheless, health service coverage 
remains very small, especially for the poor and vulnerable segments of society 
(MoHFW, 2012). In Bangladesh, households borne on an average of 62% of total 
healthcare expenditure (THE) each year during 2010-15 through out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payments (MoHFW, 2018). Because of these payments, a large proportion 
of households (15.7% using 10% of total spending as a threshold level) was facing 
catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) and many of them fell into poverty (Khan et al., 
2017). Therefore, preventing households from such payments is an important prior-
ity of health systems around the world (WHO, 2010). The resolution on Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) stressed the need to ensure quality and affordable basic 
health services globally by 2030 through achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
(UN, 2015).  UHC means that all individuals and communities receive the promotive, 
preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services when they need, 
with sufficient quality, at an affordable price (WHO, 2010). According to World Health 
Organization (WHO), three dimensions of coverage should be secured to achieve 
UHC: 1) all segments of the population should be covered 2) a comprehensive set 
of quality services according to need and 3) financial protection in accessing care 
that avoids individuals being inhibited from accessing healthcare and protecting them 
from the financial consequences of OOP payments (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Three dimensions to consider when moving towards Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC)
Source: (Busse and Chlette, 2008; WHO, 2010)
2Bangladesh is currently facing the challenges of rising healthcare costs due 
to epidemiological transition, increased health awareness, new diagnosis and 
treatment (Karar et al., 2009). Bangladesh’s government spent only 629.8 BDT 
(Bangladeshi Taka) or 6.2 USD per capita on healthcare in 2012, while per capita 
OOP spending on health amounted to 1,723.0 BDT (17.1 USD) (MoHFW, 2015). 
Private healthcare expenditure accounted for 68.6% of total health expenditure, 
of which 92.3% was covered by OOP payments (MoHFW, 2015). Despite signifi-
cant improvement in various health indicators, there is still an insufficient supply 
of healthcare resources to public facilities and due to high dependency on private 
provisions for healthcare, limited financial risk protection is observed in the health 
system of Bangladesh. It is thus important to critically investigate the challenges 
and potential to achieve UHC in Bangladesh.
In two recent studies on measurement of UHC performance, Bangladesh  scored 
32%  and 38% of UHC indices which indicated considerable  gaps in UHC achieve-
ment in this country (Khan et al., 2019; Wagstaff and Neelsen, 2020). This gap in 
UHC achievement can be explained by inadequate service coverage and financial 
risk protection due to dependency on OOP payments. Uddin et al., 2010 found 
that the number of fully immunized children was significantly lower in rural hard-
to-reach areas like in wetland (haor) and hills compared to the  national coverage 
(Uddin et al., 2010). Rahman et al., 2017 showed that the coverage of four or more 
antenatal care services was 3.6 times higher in the richest quintile compared to 
the poorest (Rahman et al., 2017). A benefit incidence analysis showed that the 
overall healthcare benefits in Bangladesh were pro-rich, particularly because of the 
private providers (Khan et al., 2016). The provisions of services for rehabilitation 
and non-communicable conditions (including mental health) are still inadequate 
in the health system (Mamin and Hayes, 2018; Hossain et al., 2019). These gaps 
in coverage of essential health services can be explained by inadequate health-
care resources, inefficiency in supply-side and lack of health awareness in the 
demand-side (Islam et al., 2018b; Ahmed et al., 2019; Joarder et al., 2019).  It is 
further noticeable that only 23% of the THE comes from tax funding and less than 
2% from health insurance, which contributes barely to a limited scope of risk pool-
ing and consequently to a low financial protection for healthcare (MoHFW, 2018).
Though Bangladesh has a comprehensive set of policies for UHC (e.g., Healthcare 
Financing Strategy of Bangladesh) and strong political commitment for this, there 
are barriers pertaining to the larger policy level which includes a rigid public financ-
ing structure dating from the colonial era (Islam et al., 2018a). The other challenges 
include the health sector’s implementation shortfalls (e.g. political interference, 
human resources, monitoring, and supervision) and demand-side barriers (e.g. 
socio-cultural factors) (Joarder et al., 2019). However, progress has been made in 
a number of areas including the roll out of the essential package of health  services 
3for all, expansion of access to primary healthcare services through external donor 
funding, and the piloting of Health Protection schemes (Shasthyo Shuroksha 
Karmasuchi) in three subdistricts (MoHFW, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2018a).
According to the International Labor Office (ILO), informal employments comprise 
self-employed workers, unpaid domestic workers, and employers and employees 
working in businesses with less than 10 employees (Hussmanns, 1998). Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) reported that informal workers (in the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors) alone account for 88% of Bangladesh’s total labour force, 
which contributes to 64% of the total GDP of the country (Maligalig et al., 2009). It 
is, therefore, necessary to provide this population with need-based quality health-
care through sustainable and affordable mechanisms of financing healthcare.
For low-income populations in Bangladesh, tax-revenue and pre-payment schemes 
(like Community-based health insurance/CBHI, micro health insurance) are two 
possible mechanisms for financing health services (MoHFW, 2012; Vargas et al., 
2016). The government allocates only a small portion of its budget to healthcare 
(5% of the government’s budget in 2018-19) and even this minimum commitment is 
subject to political negotiations across different competing interests, i.e., education, 
defence (The Daily Star, 2020). Therefore, the funding healthcare for low-income 
people (especially informal workers) through taxation appears to be challenging for 
this large group of population. Apart from tax revenue, pre-payment health schemes 
can be a major source of generating new fund for healthcare (Vargas et al., 2016). 
1.2 Healthcare Financing Strategy of Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s government introduced the country’s first healthcare funding strategy 
(HCFS) as a plan for establishing sustainable and equitable healthcare financing 
mechanisms in the country by 2032 (MoHFW, 2012). In HCFS, different prepayment 
mechanisms have been proposed for three segments of the population (Figure 2) 
in addition to the existing tax-funded public health facility network throughout the 
country (MoHFW, 2012). Through publicly funded non-contributory health protec-
tion scheme, the poorest segment of the population (31.5% of the total popula-
tion) will be covered. Bangladesh government is piloting the Shasthyo Shuroksha 
Karmasuchi (SSK) health protection scheme targeting this population group (Ahmed 
et al., 2018a). The employees in the formal sector of the economy (12.3% of the 
total population) can be covered by social health insurance through a contribution 
from their salary as an earmarked health tax. The largest proportion of the popula-
tion (56.2%) belongs to the informal sector of the economy with limited ability to 
pay. A small premium for the CBHI and micro health insurance may be applicable 
to this population as an interim measure. Such interim schemes might have the 
potential for inclusion in the social health insurance system in the long run.  
4Figure 2. Proposed healthcare financing strategy across different population group 
in Bangladesh
Source: (MoHFW, 2012).
Accumulation of prepayment contribution (e.g., income tax and social insurance 
contributions) from this large population at informal employment is a challenge 
since they have irregular income, and this income is often not traceable under the 
national income tax system. Therefore, besides the currently available publicly 
funded healthcare system, the pre-payment health schemes like CBHI, micro-
health insurance schemes were recommended for securing sustainable healthcare 
for informal workers (MoHFW, 2012). The HCFS recommended investigating the 
feasibility and impact of the CBHI and micro health insurance schemes among 
the informal workers in the country.
1.3 Risk pooling mechanisms for mitigating effect of 
out-of-pocket payments
Reliance on OOP has two major consequences. Firstly, it causes severe financial 
hardship and impoverishment to the households (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; 
Xu et al., 2003; O’Donnell et al., 2005; Amaya Lara and Ruiz Gómez, 2011; Khan 
et al., 2017)  and people often forced to choose harder coping mechanisms such 
as interest borrowing, asset selling (Rahman et al., 2013a). Secondly, it leads to 
Poor
■ Tax-funded publicly financed health care 
Non-contributory health protection mecha-
nisms (e.g., SSK) part of the Social Health 
Protection Scheme
Informal sector
■ Tax-funded publicly finenced health care 
with user fee retention
■ Community-based health insurence 
initiatives
■ Micro health insurence
■ Other innovative initiatives
■ Gradual move to Social Health Protection 
Scheme coverage 
Formal sector
■ Tax-funded publicly fmenced health care 
with user fee retention
■ Social Health Protection Scheme 
■ Complementaiy private coverage
Below poverty line 
31.5%  
48 MILLION
Informal sector 56.2% 
85.7 MILLION
Formal sector 12.3% 
18.8 MILLION
PO
PU
LA
TI
O
N
 1
52
.5
 M
IL
LI
O
N
 (2
01
2)
SO
C
IA
L 
TR
AN
SF
ER
5an unmet need for healthcare because of unaffordability by low-income and poor 
people. This often leads low-income and poor people to seek healthcare from non-
trained providers, who are cheaper, but in many cases, it may result in adverse 
effects on health or inadequate care (Donnell, 2007). These dual consequences 
of OOP expenditure, i.e., CHE and inadequacy of healthcare address two dimen-
sions of UHC namely, the ‘financial protection’ and ‘service coverage’ (WHO, 2010). 
To achieve UHC, the WHO recommends that protection against the risk of large 
healthcare costs or CHE be assured by the distribution of risk among the population 
by pre-payment (WHO, 2010). As presented in the HCFS, the inclusion of informal 
workers in risk pooling mechanisms (e.g., social health insurance) is a challenge 
because of their irregular income and the difficulty of collecting contributions from 
them through the tax system (Akazili, 2010; Vargas et al., 2016). Occupational 
associations/cooperatives and the employer-financed scheme could be a base for 
engaging such workers for healthcare financing (Devadasan and Nandraj, 2006; 
Akazili, 2010; Khan and Ahmed, 2013).
1.4 Community-based health insurance scheme (CBHI)
CBHI is a not-for-profit insurance scheme aimed primarily at the informal sector and 
formed on the basis of a collective pooling of health risks and in which the mem-
bers participate in its management (Devadasan and Nandraj, 2006). Occupational 
associations/cooperatives can provide a platform to engage informal workers in 
healthcare financing through the initiation of the CBHI (Akazili, 2010; MoHFW, 
2012). Bangladesh appears to have little experience with such healthcare financ-
ing schemes despite its potential to create such schemes using cooperatives of 
informal workers (Sarker et al., 2016; IHCO, 2018).
A CBHI scheme, consisting of a group of informal workers, was piloted through a 
cooperative called the Labour Association for Social Protection (LASP) for ensur-
ing access to quality healthcare for them. The scheme’s enrolment was voluntary. 
Several marketing interventions were conducted to increase the enrolment in the 
scheme (such as group meetings and individual marketing staff counselling). The 
unit of enrolment was the household of the informal workers. A brief description of 
the CBHI scheme is presented below:
• Target population: Informal low-income workers and their family  members 
in the sub-district of Chandpur (including urban and rural areas) in 
Bangladesh.
• Implementation entity: Cooperative under the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rural Development and Co-operatives 
6• Beneficiaries: For one membership card, six members of each household 
are entitled to the benefits of the scheme. The children under the age of 
5 years were compulsorily enrolled in the scheme and not counted under 
the beneficiary limit. 
• Benefit package: (Table 1).
• Premium: 600 BDT (USD 7.72) per household per year, which is 2.68% 
of the annual average income of informal workers (22,352 BDT or USD 
287.6 (ADB, 2010)
Table 1. The service package of the community-based health insurance scheme 
Services Co-payment/description
Health benefits
GP Consultation 30 BDT (Market price=300 BDTa)
Medicine 20% discount from maximum retail price
Diagnostic tests 50% discount on market price
Specialist Doctor’s consultation 100 BDT (Market price=500 BDT)
Hospitalization Maximum 4,000 BDT per household per year
Periodic satellite clinics in remote  
rural areas
Free of charge
Non-health benefits
Savings opportunity § Minimum 10 BDT and maximum 100 BDT 
per week per household
§ Member can withdraw saved amount with 
10% interest after 1 year period
Training programs § 3 months long computer training for the 
student member of the household with a cost 
1,200 BDT (market price=4,500BDT)
§  6 months long sewing training for female 
workers (free of charge)  
a1USD=77.8 BDT (Bangladesh Bank, 2015)
There was a uniform package of benefits for all members of the CBHI scheme. The 
scheme provides health insurance to members through its appointed paramed-
ics and General Practitioner (GP) and contracted specialists as well as licenced 
private healthcare facilities. The specialised doctors and healthcare facilities have 
been contracted for providing referral care (referred by GP). The per-case payment 
system was used to pay for specialist doctors and diagnostic testprovider. The 
paramedics and GPs were salaried monthly by the scheme. To our knowledge, 
there was no other health insurance scheme in the region during the project period.
71.5 Employer-sponsored health insurance scheme 
(ESHI)
With 4.2 million workers, the RMG sector has emerged as one of Bangladesh’s 
largest pools of employers and foreign currency earner. This sector contributed 
significantly to the economy by exporting more than 34.13 billion USD (84% of all 
exports) in the financial year 2018-19 (Textiletoday, 2019). Despite their strong 
contribution to the economy, the workers do not receive adequate social protec-
tion. Relative to formal jobs, RMG workers are more vulnerable to many forms of 
occupational diseases (Akhter S, Salahuddin A, Iqbal M, Malek A, 2010; Alamgir 
et al., 2013). A study revealed that among the RMG workers, 38%, 29%, and 
28% suffered from diarrhoea, cough, and breathlessness respectively and these 
are the prevailing symptoms among them (Rahman and Rahman, 2013). These 
employees have limited access to quality healthcare as it has been noted that about 
11% of RMG workers have received no treatment for their disease and most of 
them consult with local healthcare providers who have Local Medical Assistance 
and Family Planning training (56%) followed by drug sellers (21%) and traditional 
healers (10%) (Rahman and Rahman, 2013). Another study of 300 RMG workers 
showed that they had obtained no vaccination, health education or information 
related to health issues from the garment factories (Haque et al., 2008). There 
was no provision for themselves and their family members of the health centre, 
doctor, medicine and treatment for fire burning and chronic diseases. About two-
thirds (63%) of the respondents reported having lost their working days due to 
illness (Haque et al., 2008). 
For the organized workforce, industry-based ‘Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance’ 
(ESHI) has been used in developed countries and proposed for developing coun-
tries to secure access to quality healthcare and financial risk protection (Gould, 
2013; Kutzin, 1998). An employer usually offers these insurance plans as part of 
the benefits and compensation package for employees. Considering the inadequate 
accessibility of RMG workers to healthcare, Bangladesh Diabetic Somiti (BADAS), 
a Bangladesh Diabetic Association established in 1956 (Uddin, 2012), implemented 
a research-based ESHI pilot scheme during 2014-2015 (Box 1). The pilot study 
was collaborated by the United Insurance Company (UIC), Telemedicine Reference 
Center Ltd (TRCL), and the New Asia Group (RMG factories).
8Box 1. Employer-sponsored health insurance scheme 
Description of the employer-sponsored health insurance scheme
Target population: Workers of RMG factories
Implementation organizations: (Third-party payment mechanism)
1) Diabetic Association of Bangladesh (BADAS) (Health Service Provider) 
2) United Insurance Company Limited (Insurance company) 
3) The New Asia Group (RMG factories) 
Benefit package: 
1) Inpatient and outpatient treatment covered by the insurance scheme with maximum cov-
erage of 15,000 BDT (192.8 USD*) per year 
Premium: 487 BDT (6.3 USD) per year, which is borne by the employer. 
Number of enrolees: 8,000 RMG workers from 6 factories
*1 USD = 77.8 BDT (Bangladesh Bank, 2015)
It should be noted here that some diseases and conditions of health were predomi-
nantly omitted by the scheme due to high and unaffordable service costs. Such 
services comprise congenital infirmity, radiotherapy (X-ray, radium or radioactive 
isotopes treatment), dental care that does not require hospitalization for reconstruc-
tive surgery as a result of an accident, chemotherapy or any form of care when 
not supplementary or necessary to the treatment of the injury/illness which caused 
the hospitalization, special procedures, i.e., transplantation, cardiac, neurosurgery, 
face surgery, dialysis, HIV/AIDS.  
The ESHI scheme provided health insurance to workers of six New Asia Group 
garment factories (Knit-Asia Ltd, Ashulia; Knit-Asia Ltd, Shafipur; Knit-Asia Ltd, 
Nichintapur; Malek Spinning Mills Ltd; Salek Textile Ltd and Rahim Textile Mills 
Ltd) in Shafipur of Gazipur, Bangladesh. A total of 8,000 workers were enrolled 
in the insurance scheme. It needs to be noted here that BADAS has a network of 
80 health facilities and medical education centres throughout the country (Uddin, 
2012). However, health services to the ESHI enrolees were provided only from 
a newly built BADAS hospital located in Shafipur due to its proximity and from a 
tertiary level referral hospital located in Shahbag, Dhaka. 
The pilot scheme offered an annual healthcare coverage of up to 15,000 BDT (192.8 
USD) per worker per year. The premium of the scheme was 487 BDT (6.3 USD) per 
worker per year, which was borne by the RMG factories/employer. BADAS and UIC 
experimented with the ESHI scheme at a small scale and sought a scaling-up mecha-
nism and technical assistance to carry out this process in a professional manner. The 
approach was to develop a scalable, RMG-funded ESHI scheme, i.e., employer-paid 
premium, linked to the health service and insurance provider to create a sustainable 
mechanism for health financing. This ESHI scheme was piloted with the aim of provid-
ing the RMG workers in Bangladesh with financial protection for quality healthcare.
92 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The five studies in this thesis utilized different theoretical models within the area 
of healthcare and economics for conducting empirical investigations (Figure 2). 
The Von Neumann- Morgenstern, Grossman, and Andersen Healthcare Utilization 
Models were thus applied in different studies. Figure 3 summarizes the connec-
tions of the empirical studies to these theoretical models. 
Figure 3. Theoretical models under the empirical studies 
Grossman Model
Andersen Healthcare 
Utilization Model
Empirical  studies Theoretical  models
I.Catastrophic health
expenditure and economic
impoverishment
II.Willingness-to-pay   for
community-based health
insurance
III. Healthcare utilization of
community-based health
insurance members
IV.Utilization of health
services at lower out -of -
pocket payments by the
members of community -
based health insurance
Study  themes
V. Healthcare utilization and
out-of-pocket payments of
Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance members
The burden of the current 
healthcare financing 
mechanism
Demand for health 
insurance
Evaluation of pilot health 
insurance schemes
The von Neumann-
Morgenstern risk 
utility theorem
2.1 The von neumann- morgenstern risk utility theorem
The demand for health insurance can be explained using the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
risk-utility theorem (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). According to this theorem, under 
certain axioms of rational behaviour, a risk-averse individual behaves as if he or she 
is maximizing the expected utility value of his/her wealth. It shows that risk-averse 
individuals accept a reduction in their wealth if this permits them to escape the risky 
situation. The individual prefers a lower wealth with a certain probability than the high 
value of wealth with uncertain probability as the expected utility is higher for the former 
situation. The willingness-to-pay (WTP) corresponds to the amount that one is willing to 
give up from his/her wealth for maintaining a certain wealth level with health insurance 
i.e. irrespective of health condition (Zweifel, 2007). This is an estimate of the premium 
the individual is willing to pay for the risk aversion. This includes the expected value of 
loss and an excess amount for loading cost (administrative cost and profit of insurer) 
depending on the degree of risk aversion offered by the health insurance. In study II, 
we estimated the WTP of the informal workers for the CBHI scheme, considering the 
von Neumann- Morgenstern risk-utility theorem. 
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2.2 Grossman model 
The Grossman model explains the factors that influence the demand for health and 
medical care, outlined by Michael Grossman in a monograph in 1972 (Grossman, 
1972; Folland et al., 2007). In this model, health has been considered as both 
consumption and investment goods. Individuals ‘feel good’ by possessing good 
health status, which has been referred to as the consumption aspect of health. 
Individuals further can improve his/her own health by investing in, for instance, by 
health awareness, education, healthy diet, physical exercise, medical care, and 
so forth and such improved health can be utilized for enhancing economic out-
comes (like higher income). However, the model was extended further by other 
researchers to study health insurance, healthcare spending and the relationship 
between education and health (Muurinen, 1982; Jowett, 2004; Galama and Galama, 
2011). It was argued that individuals who face illness/depreciation in health seek 
medical care as inputs to reproduce health. Further, individuals derive pleasure 
from good health status and indirectly invest in market and non-market activities. 
Investment in health will be optimal when the marginal cost of health production 
equals the marginal benefits of the improved health status in the form of healthy 
time. Therefore, healthcare utilization and health spending are associated with 
socio-economic status (e.g., income, education) of the individuals. Selden 1993 
argued that uncertainty of illness could increase the health spending among the 
poor (e.g., informal worker) (Selden, 1993) which may further increase the chance 
of CHE in the absence of any risk pooling mechanisms for financing healthcare. 
This is because the poorer are more vulnerable to any losses in income due to 
ill health (O’Donnell et al., 2005) and consequently may face catastrophic health 
spending (Khan et al., 2017). We studied the incidence of CHE across socio-
economic groups in study I. As being sick is a higher burden on the poor, they 
should be more inclined to spend on preventive measures that will increase their 
stocks of health capital and reduce the risk of high OOP payments (Selden, 1993). 
Further, the Grossman model pointed out that demand for health is derived from the 
demand for health services. Similarly, the demand for health insurance is derived 
from the demand for health services. The insurance premium is like an investment 
in health since it gives access to health services, which may enhance health status 
in case of illness (Jowett, 2004). We assessed the demand for health insurance 
and its determinants in study II. We, further, investigated if insurance enrolment, 
which is considered as an investment in health, influenced level of healthcare 
utilization in study III and V. 
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2.3 Andersen healthcare utilization model
The Andersen Healthcare Utilization Model was developed by Ronald M. Andersen 
in 1968 (Andersen and Newman, 1973). This conceptual model demonstrates that 
the usage of health services is determined by three dynamics, i.e., predisposing 
factors, enabling factors, and need factors. Predisposing factors consist of, for 
instance, demographic and socio-economic characteristics as well as health beliefs 
(Figure 4). Examples of enabling factors are family support, educational level, 
availability of healthcare providers, distance to the nearest healthcare provider 
and health insurance. Need factors can be both perceived and the actual need 
for healthcare services, which can be reflected in illness. 
Figure 4. Andersen healthcare utilization model
Predisposing factors Enabling factors Perceived need factors
Race
Sex
Age
Income
Education
Healthcare utilization
Region
Disease
Disability
Health insurance
Availability of 
Provider
Poverty
Utilization of health 
service
Source: Modified from (Andersen and Newman, 1973)
The predisposing factors (e.g., age, sex, marital status) and need factors (e.g., 
types of symptom/illness suffered) were considered as confounding factors in my 
studies III and V. The WTP for health insurance can be considered as predispos-
ing factors since it reflects demand for health insurance which is an enabling fac-
tor for healthcare utilization. We studied health insurance as a factor for utilizing 
medically trained providers in study III and V. 
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3 AIMS
3.1 Overall aim
The main objective of this thesis is twofold: firstly, to study the impact of the existing 
healthcare financing system on the financial risk of households and secondly, to 
explore potential solutions to mitigate such risk through community-based (CBHI) 
and employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) schemes.
3.2 Specific objectives
The following central research questions were investigated to meet the main aim 
of the study:
I. To what extent does the out-of-pocket healthcare financing method 
increase the financial risk of households? 
II. What is the magnitude of willingness-to-pay (WTP) among informal 
workers for CBHI?  
III. Does CBHI increase healthcare utilization of informal workers from 
medically trained healthcare providers (MTPs)? 
IV. Does CBHI reduce out-of-pocket health expenditure for utilizing health-
care from MTPs among informal workers?  
V. Does ESHI increase utilization of health services from MTPs and 
decrease out-of-pocket payments for such health services of ready-
made garment workers? 
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4 METHODS
Five studies have been conducted using primary and/or secondary data. Bangladesh 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), 2016, was used to investigate 
the effects of high OOP payments on the financial risk of households for healthcare 
(Study I). The Contingent Valuation Method was used to assess the demand for 
health insurance in terms of WTP (Study II).  To investigate the effects of health 
insurance schemes, the quasi-experimental case-control study was conducted 
(Study III and IV). The comparison was made between the intervention group 
(enrolled workers in the insurance scheme) and comparison group (matched 
uninsured workers) in terms of use of services by eligible providers and health 
service recipients’ OOP expenses. Cross-sectional pre-post surveys were con-
ducted among the insured and uninsured RMG workers for assessing the effects 
of the ESHI scheme on the utilization of healthcare and their dependency on OOP 
payments (Study V). Table 2 summarises the design, data sources, analyses and 
outputs of all five studies.
Table 2. Overview of the five studies of the thesis
Study 
characteristics
Study I Study II Study III Study IV Study V
Design Cross-
sectional 
study
Cross-
sectional 
study
A case-
control study 
with propen-
sity score 
matching
Same as 
study III 
A case-control 
study with a 
cross-sectional 
survey in 
pre- and post-
intervention 
periods 
Inclusion criteria 
and population 
The general 
population of 
Bangladesh 
(nationally 
representa-
tive sample)
Informal 
workers 
aged over 18 
and have at 
least 1-year 
experience 
in the current 
occupation
Insured 
households 
of the CBHI 
scheme and 
matched 
comparison 
from the 
same area, 
household 
composi-
tion, location 
(same village) 
and house-
hold income 
Same as 
study III 
Insured and 
uninsured 
ready-made 
garment work-
ers working in 
the selected 
factory for the 
last six months 
period
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Sample size 
and data 
sources
Household 
Income and 
Expenditure 
Survey 2016 
conducted 
by the 
Bangladesh 
Bureau of 
Statistics
557 informal 
workers were 
interviewed. 
Primary 
data were 
collected 
through a 
household 
survey.
In total 1,292 
(646 insured 
and 646 
uninsured) 
house-
holds were 
surveyed
Same as 
study III
1,924 (480 
from the 
insured and 
482 from the 
uninsured, in 
pre- and post-
intervention 
period) ready-
made garment 
workers were 
surveyed from 
the insured 
and uninsured 
ready-made 
garment 
factories 
respectively
Outcomes Incidence of 
catastrophic 
health 
expenditure 
and impov-
erishment 
due to out-
of-pocket 
healthcare 
payments 
Willingness-
to-pay for 
CBHI among 
informal 
workers
Utilization 
of medi-
cally trained 
healthcare 
providers 
by informal 
workers
Out-of-
pocket 
payments 
for utilizing 
medically 
trained 
healthcare 
providers by 
the informal 
workers
Utilization 
of medically 
trained health-
care providers 
and related 
out-of-pocket 
payments 
among ready-
made garment 
workers
Control 
variables
Age, sex, 
marital sta-
tus, house-
hold size, 
education 
level, monthly 
income, ill-
ness in 
the last 6 
months, 
location, 
occupation
Age, sex, 
marital sta-
tus, occu-
pation, 
education 
level, monthly 
income, ill-
ness in 
the last 6 
months, 
location, 
occupation
Age, sex, 
marital sta-
tus, occu-
pation, 
education 
level, loca-
tions, illness 
or symptoms 
suffered, 
inpatient 
care utiliza-
tion, house-
hold size 
and asset 
quintiles
Age, sex, 
marital 
status, 
occupation, 
house-
hold size, 
 education 
level, wealth 
quintiles, 
illness or 
symptoms 
suffered 
and inpa-
tient care 
utilization
Age, sex, 
marital status, 
occupation, 
education, ill-
ness or symp-
toms suffered 
and inpatient 
care utilization, 
health insur-
ance status, 
household size 
and income
Econometric 
analysis
Descriptive, 
chi-square 
test, multi-
ple logistic 
regression
Descriptive, 
one-way 
analysis of 
variance 
(ANOVA), 
log-linear 
regression 
model
Descriptive, 
propensity 
score match-
ing, chi-
square test, 
independ-
ent sample 
proportion 
test, multi-
level logistic 
regression 
model
Descriptive 
analysis, 
propen-
sity score 
matching, 
two-part 
regression 
model
Descriptive 
analysis, 
difference-
in-difference 
and two-part 
regression 
model
The details of the methods used in each study will been described in the  following 
section.
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4.1 Methods applied in the sub-studies
4.1.1 Study I
HIES is commonly used worldwide, especially in low-income developing countries, to 
assess poverty levels and people’s living standards. HIES in Bangladesh is a periodic 
cross-sectional survey conducted every five-year period by the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics (BBS). In study I, we used secondary data from the most recent HIES in 
2016. This survey provides useful data on household income, expenditure, consump-
tion, savings, condition of housing, schooling, employment, health and sanitation, 
accessibility to safe drinking water and electricity supply.  HIES used a stratified ran-
dom sampling method in two stages. In the first stage, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) 
throughout the country from 20 strata (8 rural, 8 urban, and 4 metropolitan areas) were 
randomly selected for national representation and in the second stage, households 
within each PSU were randomly selected (BBS, 2016). Using this sampling method, a 
total of 46,076 households were included in HIES 2016. However, 45,977 households 
reported the expenditures information (Appendix 1). The HIES survey provided data 
on household OOP spending for healthcare in the last 30 days for outpatient services 
and 12 months for inpatient services (prior to data collection) and details of households’ 
other spending (BBS, 2016). These data were used to measure the incidence of CHE as 
a result of OOP expenses and their effects on the impoverishment (using the national 
poverty line) of households. The incidence of CHE was derived from a fraction of the 
healthcare expenses in comparison to household total consumption spending that 
crosses a certain limit (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). For CHE incidence esti-
mation, there is no single agreed threshold. However, two definitions are often used; 
firstly, OOP payments for healthcare more than 10% of total consumption expenditure 
(Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; Russell, 2004) and 
secondly, more than 40% of total non-food consumption expenditure (Berki, 1986; Xu 
et al., 2003, 2006). We estimated the incidence of CHE using both threshold levels for 
clarity. The headcount of poverty was calculated using total household spending and 
such spending on health without OOP payments. The gap between these two headcount 
measures reflected the effect of OOP expenditure on impoverishment (Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer, 2003). We estimated this using both the national and the international 
(1.90 Int dollar per person per day) poverty lines. To measure the national poverty line, 
the BBS implemented the Costs of Basic Need (CBN) technique, which implies that 
this poverty line is the minimum amount of per capita spending at which each house-
hold member can attain their required basic needs including both food and non-food 
items (BBS, 2011). For the food poverty line, the market value of common eleven food 
items (rice, wheat, pulses, milk, oil, meat, fish, potato, other vegetables, sugar and fruit) 
consisting of 2,122kcal per individual per day was recorded. Then the non-food part 
of the poverty line was calculated as the median amount spent on the non-food items 
(excluding irregular spending) by each household member in food poverty. Finally, the 
overall poverty line was estimated by adding the food and non-food poverty line together 
(BBS, 2011). For identifying the determinants two multiple logistic regression models 
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were used considering CHE and impoverishment as dependent variables separately in 
each of the models. The socio-economic characteristics (e.g., sex and education level 
of household head, household size, asset quintiles, and geographic locations), chronic 
illness, healthcare use from private and so-forth  were used as the explanatory vari-
ables in these models. The Principal component analysis (PCA) approach was used 
to construct the asset  quintiles using the households assets information (Filmer and 
Pritchett, 2001; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006).
4.1.2 Study II
The bidding game version of the contingent valuation method was used to esti-
mate weekly WTP for CBHI (Drummond et al., 2008). A total of 557 informal work-
ers were surveyed from three occupational groups (rickshaw-puller or drivers of 
human-driven tricycle, shopkeepers and restaurant workers) in three locations in 
Dhaka (a metropolitan city), Chandpur (a district town) and Nobinagar / Savar (a 
sub-district). The workers’ cooperatives and market places were identified using 
transect walks and informal discussions with community leaders and members. 
A list of workers was then collected from the workers’ representatives/leaders. 
Workers were asked about their demographic characteristics, monthly income, 
and spending, past six-month history of illness, bidding questions on WTP for 
CBHI and so forth. The benefit package a health scheme for low-income people, 
offered by the Gonoshasthaya Kendra (Public Health centre – a health NGO) was 
used for eliciting the WTP for health insurance (Table 3). 
Table 3. The service package of the health insurance product for estimating 
willingness-to-pay 
Health services Co-payment
Outpatient
   Medical officer visit Free of cost 
   Specialist visit 60 BDT
Inpatient 
   Bed-Payment per day 50 BDT
Diagnostic tests
   Ultra-sonography 75-150 BDT
   ECG 50 BDT
Most of the low-cost tests (Like, Blood grouping,          
Hb%, Stool test, Random Blood Sugar)
Free of cost 
   Some tests (like Blood TC/DC/ESR, Urine RE) 10 - 200 BDT
   Blood transfusion of neonatal 500 BDT
   Other treatment of neonatal Free of cost 
   Normal delivery 100 - 500 BDT
   Caesarean and other surgery 2000 - 3000 BDT
   Orthopaedic surgery 3000 - 4000 BDT
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   Appendicitis 100 BDT
   Gall bladder operation 3000 BDT
Medicine 50% discount on the maximum retail 
price set by the government
After illustrating the benefit package and the process of health insurance, each inter-
viewee was asked if they were willing to participate with their household members 
in a CBHI scheme. The bidding game was then used to determine the maximum 
price (premium) a participant was willing to pay for a four-member household. Since 
the WTP estimates could be biased by the starting bid, it was assigned randomly 
during the interview to reduce such effect (Drummond et al., 2008). Average and 
median WTP was calculated, and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was 
performed to assess the differences across occupational groups and locations. The 
PCA approach was applied using information on housing materials, access to basic 
facilities such as water and sanitation, durable goods, and livestock for constructing 
the asset quintiles (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006).  
Econometric analysis: The multiple regression model was used to predict WTP 
on the basis of demographic and household characteristics, occupation, level of 
education, and previous illness history of the study participants. The natural logged 
WTP was predicted based on respondents’ demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics. Folland et al., (2007) produced a theoretical model in which premium, 
income or asset, health status and risk of income loss can affect demand for health 
insurance (Folland et al., 2007). Other researchers have identified similar factors 
in empirical investigations (Churchill, 2006; Cohen and J Sebstad, 2006; Leftley 
and Mapfumo, 2006; McCord, 2008). The model below was used in the analysis:
0 1 1 2 2ln( ) ...
1, 2,...,
i i i iY X X
i n
β β β ε= + + + +
=
Where Yi denotes WTP for joining an insurance scheme, β0 is a constant, X1, X2, 
X3,……denote the control variables, β1, β2, β3,…represents the coefficient that 
shows the magnitude and direction of the relationship of corresponding variables 
with Y, and ε is an error term. Since the natural logarithm of WTP was used as 
the dependent variable, the coefficients represented either semi-elasticities (if the 
independent variable is in natural units, e.g., age) or elasticities (if the independent 
variable is logarithmically transformed, e.g., income) (Gujarati and Porter, 2008). 
A series of diagnostic tests are performed, such as tests on the presence of het-
eroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and omitted variables.
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Further, we performed a regression model analysis using the WTP share of income 
as the dependent variable with the demographic and socio-economic character-
istics of the respondent as independent variables. Since the dependent variable, 
in this case, is a proportion (WTP as a share of income), the Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) with binomial family and logit link function was applied as proposed 
by Papke & Wooldridge, 1996 (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996).  
4.1.3 Study III
The informal workers who joined the cooperative organization (intervention) were 
compared to those who did not (comparison) to study the effect of the CBHI scheme 
on the use of healthcare. An earlier study found that in the uninsured population, 
the health service utilization rate was 6.2% (Dror et al., 2005) and it was expected 
that  the health insurance can increase such utilization by 5% (Aggarwal, 2010). 
Using this difference in healthcare use between insured and uninsured groups, 777 
households were estimated to require as samples from each of intervention and 
comparison groups (1,554 households in total) to conduct this study, considering 90% 
power and 10% non-response rate (Casagrande and Pike, 1978; Ury and Fleiss, 
1980). From the list of all insured households, random sampling was performed 
for selecting them for the survey. For each insured one uninsured household was 
identified from the same village with a similar occupation of the household head. 
The head of the household was interviewed using a structured questionnaire. During 
the survey, 1,292 households (83.1% response rate) with a total of 6,694 persons 
(insured, 3,548; uninsured, 3,146) responded to this questionnaire. Questions related 
to household socio-economic characteristics and their utilization of  different types of 
healthcare providers (including both medically trained and untrained providers) in the 
last 90 days were asked in this survey.  MTPs included general practitioners/MBBS 
doctors, specialized doctors, private clinics, medical college and district hospitals, the 
Upazila Health Complex and NGO clinics as these healthcare organisations employ 
medically educated staff. The village doctors, drug sellers and traditional healers 
were classified as non-trained providers (Ahmed et al., 2009). A chi-square test 
was performed for testing if there was a significant difference between insured and 
uninsured groups in the use of health services from MTPs. Lastly, multilevel logistic 
regression was applied as detailed in the section below ‘Multilevel logistic model’ 
to assess the association between CBHI enrolment status and utilization of MTPs, 
while controlled for types of occupation, demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics, geographic location and so forth. The PCA approach was applied for 
constructing the asset quintiles using the household asset information (Filmer and 
Pritchett, 2001; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). 
Propensity score matching: Since the baseline information for intervention and compari-
son groups were not available in this study, baseline bias can exist after direct match-
ing of household and individual characteristics. Therefore, to minimize the baseline 
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difference in the characteristics, a propensity score matching (PSM) approach was 
employed in estimating the impact of the CBHI scheme on the utilization of healthcare 
from MTPs (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Wagstaff et al., 2009). The PSM is a statisti-
cal tool which weights differences in observable variables between the individuals of 
insured and uninsured households. A logistic model was employed for estimating the 
propensity score. Based on the closeness of the estimated propensity score of each 
individual from the insured group to the individual from the uninsured group, a matched 
sample was drawn. The radius matching method was used to estimate the matched 
sample using the recommended caliper size (standard deviation of the logit score is 
multiplied by 0.2) (Austin, 2011). Figure 5 shows the propensity score distributions in 
the insured and the uninsured groups before propensity score matching application and 
after matching. Before propensity score adjustment, the insured and uninsured group 
were dissimilar with regard to the characteristics measured by the propensity score, 
and after matching, they are similar. After matching 2,519 individuals from each group 
were included in the analysis. In the matched sample, 639 households were from the 
insured group and 611 households were from the uninsured group. After matching no 
significant difference in demographic and socio-economic factors was observed except 
age-group (p<0.05) between insured and uninsured group (Appendix 2).  
Figure 5.  Distribution of propensity score in the insured and uninsured groups 
before propensity score matching application and after matching
(a) Before matching                                (b) After matching
Multilevel logistic model: The multilevel logistic model was used to predict the 
likelihood of healthcare utilization from MTP by health insurance status while 
controlling for demographic and household socio-economic characteristics. We 
used this analysis to account for the hierarchical structure of the two levels of data 
(Subramanian et al., 2003). The primary explanatory variable of interest in this 
analysis, membership in the CBHI scheme, was at the household level, and the 
dependent variable healthcare utilization from MTP was at the individual level. As 
control variables, we included individual characteristics such as age, sex,  education, 
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illness frequency and type of illness and household  characteristics such as asset 
quintiles and household size. From this analysis, we estimated the significant dif-
ference in the utilization of MTPs between intervention and comparison as well as 
the magnitude of that difference. The model was specified as:
logit (Yij) = βXij + γwj + rij
Where Xij is a vector of characteristics of ith participants living in jth household, and 
wj is a vector of household characteristics. The coefficient β characterizes partial 
association between individual characteristics (like, age, sex, marital status, occu-
pation, education, illness or symptoms suffered and inpatient care utilization) and 
utilization of healthcare from MTP whereas; γ characterizes the partial associa-
tion between household characteristics (like, health insurance status, household 
size and asset quintiles) and such healthcare utilization. The rij is an error term. 
We estimated the odds ratio and its 95% confidence interval from this analysis.
4.1.4 Study IV
OOP payments for healthcare were defined as any payments related to medical 
fees, user fees for public care, purchases of medicines (whether prescribed or not), 
co-payments for insurance, and payments for equipment and diagnostic tests (van 
Doorslaer et al., 2006). This study used the same sample (1,292 households) of study 
III. Average and median OOP payment estimates were compared between ‘insured’ 
and ‘uninsured’ groups, taking into account different dimensions such as income, occu-
pations, household size, geographic locations. To test the statistical significance of the 
difference in OOP payments between insured and uninsured groups, the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney and two-way ANOVA tests were performed. The two-part regression 
model was used to determine the relationship between OOP expenses and the CBHI 
scheme while controlled for some confounding factors including demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, occupational conditions etc. 
Similar to study III, we applied the PSM approach to identify a matched sample 
for the insured and uninsured group from the collected data. The overall approach 
was similar as explained in section 4.1.3. However, we used OOP payments as the 
outcome variable in this matching. Figure 6 shows the distribution of propensity 
scores before and after matching in the insured and the uninsured groups. Before 
propensity score adjustment, the insured and uninsured groups were dissimilar 
with regard to the characteristics measured by the propensity score, and after 
matching, they are similar. Finally, 2,502 individuals from the insured group and 
the same number from the uninsured group were included in the analysis. There 
was no significant difference in background characteristics between insured and 
uninsured except age group (Appendix 3).
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Figure 6. Distribution of propensity scores in the insured and uninsured groups 
before and after matching
(a) Before matching                               (b) After matching
Econometric analysis: Two-part regression analysis was conducted to estimate the 
effect of individuals’ enrolment in the CBHI scheme on OOP payments for seeking 
healthcare from the MTP. We additionally estimated the association of OOP pay-
ments with healthcare utilization from non-trained providers. The OOP payment was 
a limited dependent variable and was continuous over most of its distribution but had 
a mass of observations at zero values. The decision of healthcare expenditure and 
the magnitude of expenditure might not be statistically independent (Jones, 1989; 
Okunade et al., 2010). Application of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation 
method of regression coefficient to only part of the sample who spent for healthcare 
raised the possibility of sample selection bias (Jones, 2000). In this case, a two-part 
regression model was applied (Okunade et al.,, 2010; Rahman et al., 2013b). The 
first part involved the likelihood of incurring any healthcare costs, where 0 and 1 
meant ‘no cost’ and ‘any cost’ respectively. This was incorporated in the two-part 
model with a logit function. The second part considered the magnitude of OOP 
healthcare payments. An ordinary least square function was used to model it with 
the consumption decision. Thus the two-part model used the information on both 
the probability and magnitude of OOP payments for healthcare simultaneously in 
assessing predictors like enrolment in the CBHI scheme along with other covari-
ates (Cragg, 1971; O’Donnell et al.,, 2008). In summary, the dependent variable for 
the logit model was a dichotomous variable that indicated whether OOP expenses 
were incurred (the participation decision). The ordinary least square regression 
model part analyzed the natural logarithm of OOP payments (Yi) as a function of 
the covariates (Rahman et al., 2013b). In addition to the main variable of interest, 
i.e., ‘membership of the CBHI scheme’ several control variables like asset quintiles, 
education level, household composition, healthcare utilization, geographic location 
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and health condition were included as control variables in the regression model. 
The model is presented in the equation below (O’Donnell et al., 2008),
Yi = β0 + β1 X1i + β2 X2i + β3 X3i + … + εi                εi ~ IN(0, σ2) 
Observed OOP payments are assumed to be,
                 Yi, if Yi > 0 
Yi =  
                   0, otherwise
 
Where, Yi= the natural logarithm of OOP payments, β0 is a constant, X1i indicates 
if the household had membership in CBHI scheme with values 0 or 1 (0= did not 
have a membership, 1= had membership), β1 is the coefficient that shows mag-
nitude and direction of relationship with insurance status, X2i, X3i... denote con-
trol variables, β2, β3 ... represent the estimated coefficients, and εi is the random 
error term of the model.
The Tobit model also can address the problem with a large number of zero 
responses of the dependent variable. Although the two-part model is a more popular 
approach to modelling medical expenditures and preferred by O’Donnell et al., 2008 
(O’Donnell et al., 2008), we included findings from Tobit model in Appendix 8. The 
95% confidence interval was presented for the coefficients of regression analysis.
4.1.5 Study V
The ESHI scheme included workers in six RMG factories located in Safipur of 
Gazipur, Bangladesh. The comparison group was the workers at a purpose-
fully chosen RMG factory situated in the same location, where health insurance 
was not offered. Data was collected in two-time points, namely pre-and post-
intervention periods, for both intervention and RMG comparison factories. Using 
rates of healthcare utilization for two groups (7.6% in diagnosis and 6.2% in the 
comparison group) at an error level of 10% and power of 85%, 372 workers were 
required per group for assessing the effect. Considering the 30% drop-out between 
pre-and post-surveys, a total of 1,936 garment workers (484 intervention and 484 
comparisons each period) were required  (Dror et al., 2005; Ury & Fleiss 1980; 
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Casagrande & Pike 1978). Finally, 1,924 workers were responded (480 from the 
IG and 482 from the UG in pre-and post-intervention periods) to the survey.
The difference in Difference (DiD): The DiD approach was used to quantify obser-
vable differences in OOP expenditures and the use of MTPs by ESHI scheme 
participants and non-participants. The DiD is a counterfactual estimate derived by 
measuring the change in outcomes in the intervention group, which is deducted 
from the change in outcomes in the comparison group between the pre- and post-
intervention periods (Gertler et al., 2011). If we assume that factors affecting the 
outcome other than the ESHI scheme remained stable in the insured (IG) and 
uninsured (UG) groups over time or followed a parallel change, then a DiD analysis 
will uncover the net effect of the scheme on the outcome (Rao et al., 2014). The 
table below illustrates the idea of DiD (Table 4),
Table 4. Difference-in-difference estimate
Pre-intervention Post-intervention
Intervention A B
Comparison C D
In this case, the DiD estimate of the intervention effect is: (B – A) – (D – C) (Gertler 
et al., 2011). 
In this study, we used the regression technique to measure the DiD (Meyer et al.,, 
1995). Two dummy variables S (1= Insured, 0= Uninsured) and T (1=post-interven-
tion and 0=pre-intervention) were generated and inserted into a regression model 
with outcome variables (Y) such as OOP healthcare expenses. The regression 
model for DiD estimation was specified as below,
Yi=β0+ β1Ti+ β2Si+ β3(T×S)it+εi
The estimated β3 presents the DiD of the outcome variables.
Econometric analysis: Like study IV, to avoid the issues related to large number 
of zero responses in OOP spending, the two-part regression model was used to 
assess the association between ESHI scheme enrollment and the  participation 
decision and magnitude of OOP healthcare expenditure while controlling for covari-
ates (e.g., socio-economic and demographic characteristics) (Okunade et al., 2010; 
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Rahman et al., 2013b). The two-part regression model can be specified as below 
(O’Donnell et al., 2008),
Yi = β0 + β1 X1i + β2 X2i + β3 X3i + β4 X4i + … + εi                εi ~ IN(0, σ2) 
Observed OOP payments are assumed to be related to a latent value by the 
following,
                  Yi, if Yi > 0 
Yi = 
                 0, otherwise
Where, Yi denotes the OOP healthcare expenditure, and X1i represented the par-
ticipation in ESHI scheme membership (1= Insured and 0 = Uninsured),  X2i was 
the time-dummy (1= post-intervention period and 0 = pre-intervention period),  and, 
X3i, X4i … were the control variables (e.g., sex, age, marital status, educational level, 
job position, income, any chronic condition, inpatient care use, types of health-
care providers). The inpatient control variable was added only in the second part 
as all inpatient care incurred OOP healthcare expenditure and no variation with 
a participation decision. The β0 was a constant and β1, β2, β3,.. were the estimated 
coefficients as well as εi is the random error term of the model. OOP spending for 
seeking care from all providers (including untrained/informal providers) and MTP 
providers was predicted separately in two models using the same independent 
variables. 
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5 RESULTS
5.1 Study I
5.1.1 Out-of-pocket payments
Table 5 summarises the OOP payments of households. Approximately 75% of the 
respondents spent OOP payments for OPD over the past 30 days or IPD over the 
last 1-year time period. The mean household OOP expenses for 30 days were 
1,637 BDT, when considered total sample households even the non-payers. The 
average of OOP payments was 2,174 BDT when included only payers. 
Table 5. Distribution of out-of-pocket health expenditures (household level) for 30 
days 
Variable Mean/proportion (95% CI) 
Among total population
Average OOP in BDT (Mean) 1,637.6 (1586.1-1689.2)
Average OOP as a share of total expenditure (%) 7.8% (7.7%-8.0%)
Average OOP as a share of capacity-to-pay/non-food expendi-
ture (%) 14.3% (14.1%-14.4%)
Reported any health expenditure (%) 75.3% (74.9%-75.7%)
Conditional on making any healthcare payment
Average OOP in BDT (Mean) 2,174.0 (2106.6-2241.5)
Average OOP as a share of total expenditure (%) 10.4% (10.3%-10.6%)
Average OOP as a share of capacity-to-pay (%) 18.9% (18.7%-19.1%)
5.1.2 Catastrophic healthcare expenditure
The incidence of CHE is presented in Table 6 for two definitions across demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics. Using the first definition (OOP payments more 
than 10% of total consumption expenditure), the incidence of CHE was 24.6%. 
However, using the second definition (more than 40% of non-food expenditure), 
it was estimated at 10.9%. 
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Table 6. The incidence of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) using two threshold 
levels by demographic and socio-economic characteristics
Variables
CHE using 10% of total 
expenditure as a thresh-
old level  
CHE using 40% of 
total expenditure as 
a threshold level
% (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Sex of household head   
Female 26.0 (24.9-27.2) 11.7 (10.9-12.6)
Male 24.3 (23.9-24.8) 10.8 (10.5-11.1)
Education of household head
No institutional education 24.7 (24.1-25.3) 12.1 (11.7-12.6)
Up to primary 25.5 (24.7-26.3) 11.1 (10.5-11.7)
Secondary 24.0 (23.2-24.8) 9.6 (9.1-10.2)
Higher secondary 22.4 (20.5-24.3) 8.2 (6.9-9.5)
University 22.7 (20.9-24.6) 7.3 (6.2-8.5)
Having a child member in the household (<14 years)
No 27.6 (26.8-28.4) 13.4 (12.8-14.0)
Yes 23.4 (22.9-23.8) 9.9 (9.6-10.2)
Having an elderly member in the household (>60 years)
No 22.3 (21.9-22.7) 9.6 (9.3-9.9)
Yes 34.7 (33.7-35.7) 16.8 (16.0-17.6)
Household size (equivalence scale)
1-2 persons 28.4 (27.3-29.5) 15.3 (14.5-16.2)
3-4 persons 22.6 (22.1-23.2) 9.6 (9.2-10.0)
5 persons or more 26.0 (25.3-26.6) 11.0 (10.5-11.5)
At least one household member seek care for chronic illness 
No 10.1 (9.7-10.5) 4.3 (4.1-4.6)
Yes 39.7 (39.0-40.3) 17.8 (17.3-18.3)
At least one household member utilized inpatient service
No 21.3 (20.9-21.7) 9.2 (9.0-9.5)
Yes 61.7 (60.1-63.3) 29.7 (28.2-31.1)
At least one household member utilized the public facility
No 20.5 (20.1-20.9) 8.8 (8.5-9.1)
Yes 52.4 (51.2-53.7) 25.1 (24.0-26.2)
At least one household member utilized the private facility
No 19.8 (19.4-20.2) 8.3 (8.1-8.6)
Yes 64.9 (63.6-66.2) 32.6 (31.3-33.9)
At least one household member utilized NGO facility
No 23.7 (23.3-24.1) 10.5 (10.2-10.8)
Yes 51.5 (48.9-54.1) 24.3 (22.1-26.6)
At least one utilized other providers (e.g., drug seller)/ self-treatment
No 18.0 (17.5-18.4) 8.7 (8.4-9.1)
Yes 34.9 (34.2-35.6) 14.3 (13.8-14.8)
Location
Urban 22.1 (21.4-22.8) 8.6 (8.1-9.0)
Rural 25.6 (25.1-26.1) 11.9 (11.6-12.3)
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Asset quintiles
Poorest 25.2 (24.3-26.1) 13.4 (12.7-14.1)
2nd 25.5 (24.6-26.4) 12.2 (11.5-12.9)
3rd 25.2 (24.3-26.1) 11.0 (10.4-11.7)
4th 24.8 (23.9-25.7) 10.1 (9.5-10.7)
Richest 22.0 (21.2-22.9) 6.3 (5.8-6.8)
Total 24.6 (24.2-24.9)  10.9 (10.6-11.2)
The descriptive statistics showed for both estimations that the incidence of CHE 
was higher among the households with female head, smaller household (1-2 
persons), presence of elderly (above 60 years), utilized of healthcare for chronic 
illness, used of private health facility, living in rural areas, and belonged to the poor-
est socio-economic group. The distribution of the sample by different demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics is presented in Appendix 1.
5.1.3 Determinants of catastrophic healthcare expenditure
Table 7 presents the factors associated with the incidence of CHE using the 
first definition (OOP payments exceeds 10% of total household consumption 
expenditure) in model 1, and the second definition (OOP payments exceeds 40% 
of subsistence expenditure) in model 2. The household head’s educational level, 
having an elderly member in the household, household size, seeking healthcare 
for chronic illness, utilization of private providers, geographic location, and asset 
quintiles were significantly associated with the incidence of CHE. Our estimated 
odds ratio for educational attainment showed that a household head with university-
level education was 0.770 (95% CI: 0.626; 0.948) times less likely to experience 
CHE (definition 2) than a household having a head with no institutional educa-
tion. Similar interpretations could be made by the odds-ratio of other independent 
variables that explained the likelihood of CHE incidence significantly (measured 
using both definitions). 
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Table 7. Factors associated with the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE)
Variable Description
Model 1 (Dependent= 
CHE using 10% of total 
expenditure)
 
Model 2 (Dependent= 
CHE using 40% of sub-
sistence expenditure)
OR (95%CI)  OR (95%CI)
Sex of household 
head
Male  
(Ref= Female) 0.95 (0.878,1.029) 1.017 (0.918,1.128)
Education of 
household head
Up-to primary 
(Ref= No 
institutional 
education)
1.028 (0.964,1.097) 0.93 (0.856,1.010)
Secondary 
(Ref= No 
institutional 
education)
1.011 (0.944,1.082) 0.912* (0.833,0.997)
Higher sec-
ondary 
(Ref= No 
institutional 
education)
0.983 (0.852,1.135) 0.857 (0.701,1.047)
University 
(Ref= No 
institutional 
education)
0.998 (0.867,1.150) 0.770* (0.626,0.948)
Having child 
member in the 
household
Yes (Ref= No) 0.897** (0.836,0.964) 0.900* (0.820,0.988)
Having an elderly 
member in the 
household
Yes (Ref= No) 1.317*** (1.236,1.403) 1.333*** (1.232,1.442)
Household size 
(equivalence 
scale)
3-4 persons 
(Ref= 1-2 
persons)
0.707*** (0.646,0.774) 0.621*** (0.554,0.695)
5 persons or 
more (Ref=    
1-2 persons)
0.586*** (0.528,0.650) 0.535*** (0.468,0.610)
At least one mem-
ber seek care for 
chronic illness 
Yes (Ref=No) 4.692*** (4.434,4.966) 3.703*** (3.419,4.010)
At least one 
household member 
utilized inpatient 
service
Yes (Ref=No) 1.079 (0.978,1.190) 0.96 (0.865,1.067)
At least one 
household member 
utilized the public 
facility
Yes (Ref=No) 4.117*** (3.807,4.452) 3.260*** (2.980,3.567)
At least one 
household member 
utilized the private 
facility
Yes (Ref=No) 9.880*** (9.010,10.83) 6.852*** (6.216,7.552)
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At least one 
household mem-
ber utilized  NGO 
facility
Yes (Ref=No) 0.131*** (0.111,0.153) 0.193*** (0.163,0.229)
At least one uti-
lized of other 
providers
Yes (Ref=No) 2.717*** (2.578,2.863) 1.761*** (1.646,1.884)
Location Rural (Ref= Urban) 1.046 (0.982,1.113) 1.067 (0.981,1.159)
Administrative 
divisions
Chittagong 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.643*** (0.584,0.707) 0.530*** (0.471,0.595)
Dhaka 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.467*** (0.425,0.513) 0.490*** (0.436,0.550)
Khulna 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.435*** (0.395,0.479) 0.415*** (0.368,0.468)
Rangpur 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.465*** (0.408,0.530) 0.517*** (0.440,0.607)
Rajshahi 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.486*** (0.444,0.531) 0.444*** (0.399,0.495)
Sylhet 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.410*** (0.362,0.465) 0.310*** (0.261,0.368)
Asset quintiles
2nd 
(Ref=Poorest) 0.974 (0.901,1.054) 0.854** (0.776,0.941)
3rd 
(Ref=Poorest) 0.889** (0.820,0.963) 0.720*** (0.651,0.796)
4th 
(Ref=Poorest) 0.785*** (0.722,0.854) 0.595*** (0.535,0.663)
Richest 
(Ref=Poorest) 0.630*** (0.571,0.694) 0.328*** (0.287,0.376)
Constant  0.163*** (0.142,0.188)  0.108*** (0.091,0.129)
N 45,289 45,289 
Log-likelihood (LR) -19,057 -12,406
LR chi2 12,371 5,797.1
Degrees of 
freedom 26 26
Prob > chi-square <0.000 <0.000
Pseudo R2   0.245   0.189
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Ref= Reference group
Larger households were less likely to face the CHE compared to the smaller ones in 
both models. At least one household member’s utilization of healthcare for chronic 
illness increased the likelihood to experience CHE in both models (OR=4.692, 
95% CI: 4.434,4.966 in model 1 and OR=3.703, 95% CI: 3.419,4.010 in model 2). 
Households with private facility utilization had 9.880 (95% CI: 9.010,10.83) times 
higher chance of facing CHE using the first definition. A similar finding (OR: 6.852; 
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95% CI: 6.216,7.552) was observed using the second definition (model 2). The risk 
of facing CHE was also varied significantly with geographic locations (administrative 
divisions). The residents from the Barisal division had a significantly higher risk of 
facing CHE than all other divisions. In terms of socio-economic status, households 
belonging to the highest asset quintile had significantly lower likelihoods of facing 
CHE compared to the lowest quintile in both models.
5.1.4 Economic impoverishment
The economic impoverishment impact of OOP payments in the year 2016 is shown 
in Table 8. Around 5.5% of the population (or 9.0 million individuals) pushed below 
the national poverty line for OOP payments. Corresponding poverty impact using 
the international poverty line was 3.1% of the population (or 5.1 million individuals). 
Table 8. Effect of out-of-pocket spending on poverty headcount over time
Poverty line Measurement Poverty headcount
National poverty line % population pushed below national pov-
erty line (95% CI) 5.5% (5.1%-5.9%)
Number of individuals (in millions) 9.0
1.9 international dollar 
spending per capita per 
day as the poverty line
% population pushed below the interna-
tional poverty line (95% CI) 3.1% (2.8%-3.4%)
Number of individuals (in millions) 5.1
The impact of OOP payments on poverty are presented in Pen’s Parade graphs 
(Figure 7). The graph shows the cumulative distribution of individuals ranked by 
household’s consumption expenditure. The share of OOP payments in total con-
sumption expenditure was presented with the drops (green vertical lines) from the 
pre-OOP payments consumption expenditure line.
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The households in the middle and lower half of the distribution fell below the poverty 
line due to OOP payments. The people who were already below the poverty line, 
their poverty condition were further deteriorated due to OOP payments.
5.1.5 Determinants of economic impoverishment
Table 9 presents the determinants of impoverishment due to OOP payments 
using the national (model 3) and international (model 4) poverty line. A number of 
impoverishment factors were identified through these models. Education of the 
household heads, having child members and elderly members in the household, 
larger household size, chronic illness, utilization of private provider and rural resi-
dence, and geographic location were significantly associated with impoverishment. 
The households having heads with university level education were less likely to 
get impoverished. Considering national poverty line, (model 3), if a household 
head had university-level education, the household was 0.236 times less likely 
(OR: 0.236, 95% CI: 0.166, 0.337) to face impoverishment and it was 0.114 times 
less likely (OR: 0.114 95% CI=0.0564, 0.230) to face impoverishment considering 
international poverty line. 
Table 9. Factors associated with the impoverishment from out-of-pocket healthcare 
spending
Variables Description
Model 3 (Dependent= 
impoverishment due 
to OOP payment 
using the national 
poverty line)
 
Model 4 (Dependent= 
impoverishment due 
to OOP payment 
using 1.90 Int dollar 
per person per day as 
poverty line
OR (95%CI)  OR (95%CI)
Sex of household head Male (Ref= Female) 1.034 (0.901,1.186) 0.885 (0.733,1.070)   
Education of house-
hold head
Up-to primary (Ref= 
No institutional 
education)
0.891* (0.809,0.981) 0.702*** (0.616,0.801)   
Secondary (Ref= 
No institutional 
education)
0.608*** (0.544,0.679) 0.426*** (0.363,0.501)   
Higher secondary 
(Ref= No institutional 
education)
0.281*** (0.200,0.395) 0.148*** (0.0787,0.277) 
University (Ref= 
No institutional 
education)
0.236*** (0.166,0.337) 0.114*** (0.0564,0.230)  
Having a child member 
in the household Yes (Ref= No) 1.481*** (1.307,1.678) 2.095*** (1.731,2.537)   
Having an elderly 
member in the 
household
Yes (Ref= No) 1.250*** (1.132,1.382) 1.184* (1.032,1.359)   
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Household size (equiv-
alence scale)
3-4 persons (Ref 1-2 
persons) 0.970 (0.822,1.144) 0.997 (0.774,1.283)   
5 persons or more 
(Ref=    1-2 persons) 1.058 (0.883,1.268) 1.314* (1.004,1.721)   
At least one member 
seek care for chronic 
illness
Yes (Ref=No) 2.275*** (2.073,2.498) 2.043*** (1.803,2.315)   
At least one household 
member utilized inpa-
tient service
Yes (Ref=No) 0.963 (0.838,1.107) 0.811* (0.665,0.989)   
At least one household 
member utilized the 
public facility
Yes (Ref=No) 2.214*** (1.981,2.475) 2.057*** (1.766,2.396)   
At least one household 
member utilized pri-
vate facility
Yes (Ref=No) 2.231*** (1.958,2.543) 1.803*** (1.492,2.179)   
At least one household 
member utilized NGO 
facility
Yes (Ref=No) 0.506*** (0.409,0.625) 0.696* (0.522,0.927)   
At least one household 
member utilized other 
providers
Yes (Ref=No) 1.747*** (1.608,1.897) 1.919*** (1.713,2.151)   
Location Rural (Ref= Urban) 1.469*** (1.328,1.626) 1.871*** (1.607,2.177)   
Administrative 
divisions
Chittagong 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.388*** (0.331,0.453) 0.370*** (0.297,0.462)   
Dhaka (Ref=Barisal) 0.430*** (0.369,0.501) 0.369*** (0.295,0.462)   
Khulna (Ref=Barisal) 0.710*** (0.616,0.818) 0.852 (0.702,1.034)   
Rangpur 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.677*** (0.555,0.824) 0.957 (0.748,1.225)   
Rajshahi 
(Ref=Barisal) 0.749*** (0.658,0.852) 0.926 (0.778,1.103)   
Sylhet (Ref=Barisal) 0.503*** (0.414,0.610) 0.339*** (0.251,0.457)   
Constant 0.023*** (0.018,0.028) 0.008*** (0.006,0.011)
N  45,968  45,968
Log-likelihood (LR) -9,156 -5,502
LR chi2 1,900 1,308
Degrees of freedom 22 22
Prob > chi-square <0.000 <0.000
Pseudo R2  0.094  0.106
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Ref= Reference group
The households with at least one member who sought care for chronic illness 
had 2.275 (95% CI: 2.073,2.498) times higher risk of impoverishment compared 
to the households without such members. Utilization of healthcare from pri-
vate providers also increased the risk of the impoverishment of a household by 
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2.231  (95% CI: 1.958,2.543) times considering the national poverty line and by 1.803 
(95% CI: 1.492,2.179) times while used international poverty line. Rural households 
were 1.469 (95% CI: 1.328,1.626) times more likely to be impoverished (model 3). 
A similar result was observed considering the international poverty line (model 4). 
The households in the Barisal division had a significantly higher risk of falling into 
impoverishment.
5.2 Study II
5.2.1 Willingness to join in community-based health insurance 
scheme and payment mode
Eighty-six percent of informal workers were willing to pay for CBHI, and 63.4 % of 
them wanted to pay on a weekly basis while the rest on a monthly basis (Table 10). 
Table 10. Distribution of participant’s weekly versus monthly willingness-to-pay for 
health insurance by location and occupational group
Characteristics Weekly payment Monthly payment
Locations   
Sub-district 63.6% 36.4%
District 46.8% 53.3%
Metropolitan city 78.7% 21.3%
Occupational groups   
Rickshaw-puller 78.9% 21.1%
Shop-keeper 48.4% 51.6%
Restaurant workers 60.7% 39.4%
Total 63.4% 36.7%
Across the three areas, the metropolitan city had the highest proportion of respond-
ents (78.7%) who preferred weekly payments, while the district town location had 
the highest proportion (53.3%) who chose monthly payments. Many rickshaw-
pullers (78.9%) preferred the weekly payment mode, whereas most shopkeepers 
(51.6%) chose to pay monthly.
5.2.2 Willingness-to-pay for community-based health insurance
The mean WTP elicited by the bidding process was 22.8 BDT per week (95% CI: 
20.9–24.8) which was almost 20% higher than the median WTP (20.0 BDT). The 
median WTP was the largest in the sub-district area (27.0 BDT), preceded by the 
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metropolitan city (24.5 BDT) and the district town (16.6 BDT). After omitting 13 
outliers, the mean WTP in Metropolitan City (22.5 BDT) was the largest, followed 
by sub-district (21.2 BDT) and district (16.6 BDT). Rickshaw-pullers (28.2 BDT) 
had the highest mean WTP, followed by restaurant workers (20.4 BDT) and shop-
keepers (19.2 BDT).
Table 11. Willingness-to-pay (mean and 95% confidence intervals) per week for 
community-based health insurance across occupational groups and locations
Characteristics
Average 
WTP(BDT) 
(95% CI)
Average WTP 
excluding outliers 
(BDT)
(95% CI)
Median 
WTP(BDT)
Significance 
test 
(p-value)
Locations   
Sub-district 27.0(22.5-31.6) 21.2 (18.9-23.4) 20.0 <0.000
District 16.6(14.5-18.6) 16.6 (14.5-18.6) 12.5
Metropolitan city 24.5(21.7-27.4) 22.5 (20.5-24.5) 20.0
Occupational 
groups   
Rickshaw-puller 28.2(24.7-31.7) 25.0 (22.9-27.0) 20.0 <0.000
Shop-keeper 19.2(16.1-22.4) 16.5 (14.4-18.6) 12.5
Restaurant workers 20.4(17.0-23.8) 18.2 (16.2-20.2) 15.0
Total 22.8(20.9-24.8) 20.1 (18.9-21.3) 20.0 <0.000
WTP was significantly different across locations and occupational groups, as 
observed in one-way ANOVA (Table 11).
5.2.3 Determinants of willingness-to-pay
Regression analysis (Table 12) revealed that WTP for CBHI among informal work-
ers was significantly associated with educational level, monthly income, location, 
and occupation. Workers with primary education were willing to pay 26.9% less 
than those with less than one year of schooling. With each 1 percentage point 
increase in worker’s monthly earnings, WTP increased by 0.196%. WTP was 1.4% 
and 48.7% less in the sub-district and district town respectively compared to the 
metropolitan city. Among occupational groups, WTP differed significantly, implying 
that the restaurant workers and shopkeepers were willing to pay considerably less 
than the rickshaw-pullers (68.5% and 38.6% less). The distribution of the sample 
(557 workers) by different demographic and socio-economic characteristics is 
presented in Appendix 4.
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Table 12. Association of respondent characteristics with willingness-to-pay (natural 
logged) for health insurance coverage from a multivariate regression analysis
Variables Description
Model 5. 
Coefficient (Std. 
Err.)
Age In years -0.002(0.005)
Sex Female (Ref = male) -0.15(0.193)
Marital status Unmarried (Ref = married) 0.025(0.11)
Others (Ref = married) 0.29(0.749)
Household size Number of household members 0.025(0.033)
Educational level Up to primary level (Ref = less than 
one year) -0.269** (0.112)
More than primary level (Ref = less 
than one year) -0.056(0.125)
Monthly income Logged income per month 0.196** (0.077)
Illness in the last 6 months Illness of respondent or any household 
member -0.01(0.125)
Location Sub-district (Ref= Metropolitan city) -0.014*** (0.102)
District (Ref= Metropolitan city) -0.487*** (0.105)
Occupation Shop worker (Ref= Rickshaw-puller) -0.685*** (0.127)
Restaurant workers (Ref= 
Rickshaw-puller) -0.386** (0.115)
Constant 1.83(0.672)
N  326
Adjusted R-square 0.219
F-value(14,146) (Prob>F) 8.01 (0.000)
Mean VIF (max) 1.51 (2.24)
BP/Cook-Weisberg test (p>ch2) 0.45 (0.503)
Ramsey RESET, F (p>F) 3.46 (0.017)
Note: *** and ** denote p< 0.01 and p<0.05 respectively; Ref= Reference group; Std. Err.= 
Standard error
The regression model accounts for 21.9% of all deviations of the independent variable 
(Adjusted R-square=0.219). We found that the model lacked heteroscedasticity by per-
forming the test of Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg. The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
measure had the highest value of 2.24, which suggest that the regression model was 
not affected by multicollinearity problem. Sufficient evidence of missing variable bias 
in the model was not found using the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error 
Test (RESET). To test the robustness of the association between the amount of WTP 
(natural logged) and its predictors, a robust standard error was calculated (Table 11). 
The GLM showed that the educational level, monthly income, location and occupa-
tion of the worker was significantly associated with the WTP as a share of income 
(Appendix 5). This model indicated that the higher-income households were more 
inclined to have a lower WTP share (as a percentage of the income).
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5.3 Study III
5.3.1 Utilization of healthcare
Table 13 shows the use of healthcare services among insured and uninsured groups 
in the last 90-day period prior to the data collection. We found a significant differ-
ence (P= 0.013) between insured and uninsured groups in the healthcare-seeking 
behaviour of people suffering from illness. 97.7% of insured (815) and 99.2% of 
uninsured (786) sought healthcare for illness or their conditions. A relatively higher 
percentage of insured (50.7%) than uninsured (39.4%) sought health service from 
MTPs. The highest percentage of healthcare services were used from private pro-
viders in both groups (92.3% in insured and 90.7% in uninsured groups) preceded 
by government providers (5.9% in insured and 6.7% in uninsured groups). 
Table 13. Self-reported illness and utilization of healthcare in the last 90 days 
Healthcare seeking/ 
illness
Insured Uninsured
N % (95% CI) N % (95% CI) p-valuea
Individual-level sam-
ple (N) 2,519 2,519
Suffered any illness 
or symptoms
0.210
   No 1,685 66.9 (65.0-68.7) 1,727 68.6 (66.7-70.3)
   Yes 834 33.1 (31.3-35.0) 792 31.4 (29.7-33.3)
Seek healthcare among those who suffered illness
   No 19 2.3 (1.5-3.5) 6 0.8 (0.3-1.7) 0.013
   Yes 815 97.7 (96.5-98.5) 786 99.2 (98.3-99.7)
Seek healthcare from medically trained provider among those who sought healthcare
   No 402 49.3 (45.9-52.8) 476 60.6 (57.1-63.9) 0.001
   Yes 413 50.7 (47.2-54.1) 310 39.4 (36.1-42.9)
Self-reported illness/symptoms
Communicable 
diseases 106 12.7 (10.6-15.2) 118 14.9 (12.6-17.6)
0.061
Non-communicable   
diseases 122 14.6 (12.4-17.2) 117 14.8 (12.5-17.4)
Accident and Injuries 21 2.5 (1.6-3.8) 28 3.5 (2.4-5.1)
Female reproductive 
health problem and 
delivery care 
25 3.0 (2.0-4.4) 14 1.8 (1.0-3.0)
Symptoms 415 49.8 (46.4-53.2) 411 51.9 (48.4-55.4)
Others 145 17.4 (15.0-20.1) 104 13.1 (10.9-15.7)
Healthcare provider utilized
Public 48 5.9 (4.5-7.7) 53 6.7 (5.2-8.7) 0.079
Private 752 92.3 (90.2-93.9) 713 90.7 (88.5-92.6)
NGO - (-) 6 0.8 (0.3-1.7)
Others (e g.    
traditional)
15 1.8 (1.1-3.0) 14 1.8 (1.1-3.0)
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Inpatient care utilized
   No 771 94.6 (92.8-96.0) 733 93.3 (91.3-94.8) 0.260
   Yes 44 5.4 (4.0-7.2) 53 6.7 (5.2-8.7)
aChi-square test
Insurance status (P=0.061) was not significantly related to self-reported illness or 
symptoms. However, though not significant, the self-reported illnesses or symptoms 
were differently distributed across the insured and uninsured groups. 
5.3.2 Healthcare seeking behaviour
Figure 8 demonstrates the breakdown of the utilization of healthcare from differ-
ent providers in insured and uninsured groups. It was noted that the insured uti-
lized health services 12% and 3% less from the medically untrained village doctors 
and drug sellers than their corresponding uninsured. On the other hand, the total 
service utilization from medically trained MBBS / specialist doctors was 12% higher 
among the insured than the uninsured ones. Participants of the CBHI scheme used 
“private clinics” and “Medical College hospitals and district hospitals” (14% and 5% 
respectively) higher than the uninsured households (11% and 4% respectively).
Figure 8. Healthcare seeking behaviour of community-based health insurance 
scheme enrolees and uninsured group before matching
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The utilizations of MTPs and other service providers for different self-reported 
illnesses or symptoms between insured and uninsured individuals are shown in 
Figure 9. The uses of MTPs were higher for non-communicable diseases, acci-
dents and injuries, reproductive health issues for women and care for delivery, 
other symptoms in both insured and uninsured groups. 
Figure 9. Medically trained providers utilization between insured and uninsured 
groups by self-reported illness or symptoms 
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For communicable diseases, the use of MTPs by the uninsured was significantly 
low. Such uses of MTPs for various symptoms (e.g., fever, weakness) were low 
in both insured and uninsured groups.
5.3.3 Association between community-based health insurance 
enrolment and medically trained healthcare provider utilization
The multilevel logistic regression analysis revealed that the insured were 2.111 fold 
more likely to use MTPs than uninsured (Table 14). Among the control variables, 
age, marital status, education, illnesses and symptoms, inpatient care utilization 
and asset quintiles showed significant association with MTP utilization. For instance, 
the use of MTPs was significantly lower among the individuals with single marital 
status (OR=0.371; 95% CI: 0.186-0.774) compared to the married ones. 
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Table 14. The estimated effect of community-based health insurance scheme enrol-
ment on the utilization of medically trained healthcare providers 
Independent variable Description
Model 6. 
Dependent= 
Utilized medically 
trained provider
OR (95% CI)
Health insurance status Member (Ref= No membership) 2.111*** (1.448,3.079)
Age-group
Adult, 15-60 years (Ref= Child, 0-14 years) 0.907 (0.448,1.835)
Elderly, 60+ (Ref= Child, 0-14 years) 0.301* (0.117,0.774)
Sex Female (Ref= Male) 1.039 (0.657,1.644)
Marital status 
Unmarried (Ref=Married) 0.371** (0.186,0.739)
Others like, widowed/divorced/separated 
(Ref=Married) 0.674 (0.286,1.586)
Occupation
Labour (Ref= Agriculture worker) 1.827 (0.633,5.277)
Sales worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 1.836 (0.626,5.382)
Service worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 1.295 (0.412,4.071)
Housewife (Ref= Agriculture worker) 1.337 (0.504,3.547)
Transport worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 1.527 (0.455,5.127)
Small business (Ref= Agriculture worker) 2.056 (0.546,7.735)
Not working/unemployed (Ref= Agriculture 
worker) 1.583 (0.572,4.385)
Others (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.230* (0.055,0.974)
Education level
Primary level (Ref= No institutional 
education) 1.069 (0.697,1.639)
Junior level (Ref= No institutional 
education) 1.169 (0.689,1.983)
Secondary level (Ref= No institutional 
education) 1.084 (0.555,2.118)
Higher Secondary level (Ref= No institu-
tional education) 0.948 (0.361,2.487)
Tertiary level and other (Ref= No institu-
tional education) 0.766 (0.177,3.304)
Location Urban (Ref=Rural) 0.686 (0.456,1.031)
Illness or symptoms 
suffered
Non-communicable diseases 
(Ref=Communicable diseases) 2.823*** (1.543,5.164)
Accident and Injuries (Ref=Communicable 
diseases) 3.969** (1.468,10.73)
Female reproductive health problem 
and delivery care (Ref=Communicable 
diseases)
6.204** (1.821,21.13)
Symptoms (Ref=Communicable diseases) 0.493** (0.305,0.796)
Others (Ref=Communicable diseases) 6.125*** (3.236,11.60)
Inpatient care utilized Yes (Ref=No) 8.365*** (3.659,19.13)
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Household size
4-5 persons (Ref= <=3 persons) 0.877 (0.412,1.865)
=>6 persons (Ref= <=3 persons) 1.045 (0.492,2.220)
Asset quintiles
2nd (Ref=Poorest) 1.152 (0.635,2.088)
3rd (Ref=Poorest) 2.424** (1.351,4.351)
4th (Ref=Poorest) 3.721*** (1.996,6.937)
Richest (Ref=Poorest) 6.954*** (3.580,13.51)
Constant 0.252 (0.059,1.082)
N 1,601
LR chi2(32) 146.9
Prob > chi2  0.000
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Ref= Reference group
The individuals were more likely to use MTPs for non-communicable condi-
tion (OR= 2.823; 95 % CI: 1.543-5.164), accidents and injuries (OR= 3.969; 95% 
CI: 1.568-10.73), associated complications in delivery services (OR= 6.204; 95% 
CI: 1.821-21.13), and for other disorders (OR= 6.125; 95% CI: 3.236-11.60) rather 
than communicable condition. However, such health service utilization was less 
probable for symptoms than communicable diseases (OR=0.493; 95% CI: 0.305-
0.796). Inpatient services were more probable to be sought (OR=8.365; 95% CI: 
3.659 -19.13) from the MTPs. The wealthiest household members were 6.954 times 
more likely than the poorest to use healthcare services from MTPs.
5.4 Study IV
5.4.1 Out-of-pocket payments in insured and uninsured groups
Table 15 provides the descriptive statistics of OOP expenses to seek healthcare 
from MTPs and any other providers for both insured and uninsured individuals. 
The OOP payments while seeking healthcare from all types of providers were 
smaller in the insured group (2,512 BDT) relative to the uninsured (2,660 BDT) 
although not statistically significant. In contrast, the average OOP spending for the 
services from MTPs only was significantly lower in the insured (4,189 BDT) than 
the uninsured ones (5,154 BDT). 
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Table 15. Out-of-pocket payments (BDT) for utilization of medically trained provider 
and all providers in the last 90 day between insured and uninsured individuals by 
their demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
Characteristics
All providers Medically trained providers
Insured Matched-uninsured
P-value
Insured Matched-uninsured
P-value
N 806 769 380 332
Total OOP payment 2,512 2,660 0.313a) 4,189 5,154 <0.001a)
Age group   
Child (0-14)  1,338  1,244 <0.001b)  2,781  2,655 0.002 b)
Adult (15-60)  2,846  3,252  4,435  5,723 
Elderly (60+)  3,526  2,957  4,872  6,907 
Sex  -   
Male  2,628  2,417 0.573 b)  4,425  5,147 0.284 b)
Female  2,416  2,851  4,017  5,159 
Marital status  -   
Married  3,177  3,472 <0.001b)  4,745  5,879 <0.001b)
Unmarried  1,374  1,348  2,700  3,057 
Others(Widowed 
,Divorced and Separated)
 2,818  3,225  4,510  6,897 
Household heads’ 
occupation
 -   
Agriculture worker  4,549  2,360 <0.001b)  8,102  4,286 <0.001b)
Labor  2,868  2,397  4,313  5,728 
Sales worker  1,962  3,527  2,607  4,920 
Service worker  4,075  1,390  6,771  2,562 
Housewife  2,845  3,664  4,288  5,968 
Transport worker  1,912  1,787  2,883  3,856 
Small business  2,626  6,098  3,840  9,355 
Not working or 
unemployed
 1,980  1,819  3,605  3,849 
Others  1,770  6,705  4,105  23,267 
Household size  -   
3personsorless  2,074  2,567 0.771 b)  3,502  4,719 0.120 b)
4-5persons  2,496  2,931  3,662  5,795 
6personsormore  2,578  2,421  4,827  4,596 
Years of schooling group  -   
No institutional education  2,167  1,816 0.250 b)  4,415  3,778 0.244 b)
Primary level(years1-5)  2,623  2,635  4,284  4,917 
Junior level(years6-8)  2,765  3,172  4,412  6,278 
Secondary 
level(years9-10)
 2,658  3,517  4,200  5,965 
Higher Secondary 
level(years11-12)
 2,323  3,948  2,956  8,530 
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Tertiary level(12+)  1,305  3,428  1,743  4,674 
Location  -   
Urban  2,805  2,707 0.674 b)  4,892  4,609 0.092 b)
Rural  2,378  2,640  3,868  5,455 
Asset quintiles  -   
Poorest  2,453  2,352 0.006 b)  5,240  4,899 0.267 b)
2nd  1,836  1,900  3,202  5,124 
3rd  2,189  2,358  3,706  4,076 
4th  2,789  2,624  4,500  4,882 
Richest  3,274  4,011  4,332  6,296 
a)Wilcoxon-Mann–Whitney test;   b)  Two-way ANOVA
We also observed that the OOP spending, regardless of the type of providers, 
differed significantly between insured and uninsured when stratified into different 
demographics and socio-economic attributes, namely age group, marital status, 
and occupation (Table 15).
5.4.2 Effect of community-based health insurance on out-of-
pocket payments
Table 16 illustrates the predicted consequences of CBHI enrolment on the utiliza-
tion of MTPs and all types of providers and related OOP payments when account-
ing for specific control variables. It was found that insured was 1.43 fold more 
likely to spend for utilizing health services from MTPs (95% CI=1.22-1.68) and 
their average OOP expenses were significantly smaller (by 6.40%) than the unin-
sured. In addition to CBHI status, marital status, occupation, employment and 
asset status significantly affected the OOP expenses for the use of MTPs. Being 
unmarried was negatively associated with OOP payments compared to married. 
However, the asset quintile, living in the urban area, types of illness, and use of 
inpatient services had a positive association with the OOP spending. The CBHI 
status did not have a strong relationship with OOP payments when we included 
the utilization of health services from all types of providers (including MTPs and 
medically non-trained providers)
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We applied some other econometric approaches for verifying the findings from 
the two-part models. The average treatment effect (ATE) analysis showed similar 
results as the two-part model, indicating that OOP spending by CBHI enrolees was 
significantly smaller while using MTPs (Appendix 6).  Furthermore, the incorporation 
in the assessment of PSM’s inverse probability weights did not change the relation-
ship between CBHI enrolment and OOP payments for MTPs (Appendix 7). The 
Tobit model also reported considerably less OOP compensation by insured against 
the uninsured for the use of MTPs when accounting for a variety of demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics (Appendix 8). It means that the results from 
the two-part models were verified by the various analysis methods.
5.5 Study V
5.5.1 Effect of employer-sponsored health insurance scheme 
on healthcare utilization  
The effects of the ESHI scheme on healthcare utilization has been illustrated in 
Table 17. We observed a 2.1% increase in illness in the IG and a 0.8% increase 
in the UG workers. The DiD calculation found that the use of healthcare from 
MTPs (DiD=26.1; p<0.01) was increased by about 26.0% in the IG relative to the 
UG workers. The DiD measure of the MTPs utilization decreased to 18.4% and 
remained statistically significant (p<0.05) when adjusted for the control variables. 
Table 17. Utilization of healthcare among insured and uninsured RMG workers dur-
ing baseline and end-line survey
Charac-
teristics
 Pre-intervention Post-intervention
DiD a) 
DiD 
account-
ing for 
covari-
ates
Insured (IG) Uninsured (UG) Insured (IG)
Uninsured 
(UG)
N % (95% CI) N
% (95% 
CI)  N
% (95% 
CI) N
% (95% 
CI) % %
Suffered any illness or symptoms
No 249
51.9 
(47.4-56.3) 299
62.0 
(57.6-66.3) 239
49.8 
(45.3-54.3) 295
61.2 
(56.8-65.5)
1.3 2.5
Yes 231
48.1 
(43.7-52.6) 183
38.0 
(33.7-42.4) 241
50.2 
(45.7-54.7) 179
38.8 
(34.4-43.2)
Seek healthcare among those who suffered illness
No 21
9.1 
(6.0-13.6) 20
10.9 
(7.1-16.4) 19
7.9 
(5.1-12.0) 8
4.3 
(2.1-8.3)
5.4 7.4*
Yes 210
90.9 
(86.4-94.0) 163
89.1 
(83.6-92.9) 222
92.1 
(88.0-94.9) 179
95.7 
(91.7-97.9)
Seek healthcare among the total sample
No
270
56.3   
(51.8 -60.6) 319
66.2   
(61.8 -70.3) 258
53.8   
(49.3 -58.2) 303
62.9   
(58.4 -67.1)
-0.8 -0.2
Yes
210
43.8   
(39.4 -48.2) 163
33.8   
(29.7 -38.2) 222
46.3   
(41.8 -50.7) 179
37.1   
(32.9 -41.6)
47
Seek healthcare from MTP among the ill workers  
No 159 75.7 (69.4-81.1) 80
49.1 
(41.5-56.8) 124
55.9 
(49.2-62.3) 99
55.3 
(47.9-62.5)
26.1*** 18.4**
Yes 51 24.3 (18.9-30.6) 83
50.9 
(43.2-58.5) 98
44.1 
(37.7-50.8) 80
44.7 
(37.5-52.1)
Self-reported illness/symptoms
Communicable 
diseases 68
29.4 
(23.9-35.7) 53
29.0 
(22.8-36.0) 77
32.0 
(26.4-38.1) 52
27.8 
(21.8-34.7) - -
Non-
communicable 
diseases 14
6.1 
(3.6-10.0) 4
2.2 
(0.8-5.7) 13
5.4 
(3.2-9.1) 2
1.1 
(0.3-4.2) - -
Accident and 
Injuries 2
0.9 
(0.2-3.4) 2
1.1 
(0.3-4.3) 2
0.8 
(0.2-3.3) 2
1.1 
(0.3-4.2) - -
Female repro-
ductive  
health prob-
lem and  
delivery care
1
0.4
(0.1-3.0)
2
1.1
(0.3-4.3)
3
1.2
(0.4-3.8)
10
5.3
(2.9-9.7)
- -
Symptoms of 
illness 130
56.3 
(49.8-62.6) 100
54.6 
(47.4-61.7) 131
54.4 
(48.0-60.6) 103
55.1 
(47.9-62.1) - -
Others 16
6.9 
(4.3-11.0) 22
12.0 
(8.0-17.6) 15
6.2 
(3.8-10.1) 18
9.6 
(6.1-14.8) - -
Healthcare provider utilized
Public 4
1.9 
(0.7-5.0) 5
3.1 
(1.3-7.2) 4
1.8 
(0.7-4.7) 9
5.0 
(2.6-9.4) - -
Private 198
94.3 
(90.2-96.7) 155
95.1 
(90.5-97.5) 209
94.1 
(90.2-96.6) 162
90.5 
(85.2-94.0) - -
Others (e. g. 
traditional) 8
3.8 
(1.9-7.5) 3
1.8 
(0.6-5.6) 9
4.1 
(2.1-7.6) 8
4.5 
(2.2-8.7) - -
Inpatient care utilized
No 201
95.7 
(92.0-97.8) 153
93.9 
(88.9-96.7) 217
97.7 
(94.7-99.1) 175
97.8 
(94.2-99.2)
1.9 -0.1
Yes 9
4.3 
(2.2-8.0) 10
6.1 
(3.3-11.1) 5
2.3 
(0.9-5.3) 4
2.2 
(0.8-5.8)
a)DiD= Difference-in-difference; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The healthcare-seeking from the private providers was the largest among the three 
types of providers for both IG and UG workers.
5.5.2 Effect of employer-sponsored health insurance scheme on 
out-of-pocket healthcare payments
Table 18 presents the OOP spending of RMG workers in the IG and UG groups 
during the pre-and post-intervention periods. The summary statistics revealed 
that IG and UG spent 1,198 BDT (15.4 USD) and 818 BDT (10.5 USD) as OOP, 
respectively during pre-intervention for seeking healthcare from all types of provid-
ers.  This was decreased in the IG to 951 BDT (12.2 USD) and raised in the UG 
to 1,681 BDT (21.6 USD) in the post-intervention period. 
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In conclusion, the DiD analysis revealed that there was no significant difference 
in OOP spending between IG and UG, irrespective of the utilization of health-
care from MTPs or all kinds of providers. 
Table 19 summarises the findings from the two-part regression model. Such mod-
els (Models 10 and 11) showed that the ESHI scheme had no effect on reducing 
OOP spending for seeking health services from all types of providers or MTPs only. 
Table 19. Two-part regression analysis of out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure (nat-
ural logged) for seeking care from all types of providers and from medically trained 
providers (MTPs)
Characteristics Description
Model 9:  Seek care from all 
provider
Model 10: Seek care from 
MTPsa
1st stage 
(Participation 
probit 
equation)
 
2nd stage 
(Expenditure 
log 
regression)
1st stage 
(Participation 
probit 
equation)
2nd stage 
(Expenditure 
log 
regression)
Coefficient 
 (95% CI)  
Coefficient 
 (95% CI)
Coefficient 
(95% CI)
Coefficient  
(95% CI)
Health insurance 
status
Insured (Ref= 
Matched 
Uninsured)
0.244*** 
(0.123,0.364)   
-0.122
 (-0.354,0.109)   
-0.118
(-0.279,0.0426)  
-0.143
(-.556,0.270)
Time-dummy
Post-
intervention 
(Ref= 
pre-intervention)
0.0475
 
(-0.0850,0.180) 
0.0173
 (-0.238,0.273)   
-0.0595
 (-0.233,0.114)   
0.189
(-.258,0.636)
Sex Male (Ref= Female)
-0.262*** 
 (-0.401,-0.123)
-0.294**
 
(-0.569,-0.0192)
-0.376*** 
(-0.562,-0.191)
-0.262
(-.771,0.247)
Age
20-30  years 
(Ref=  < 20 
years)
0.222** 
(0.0483,0.396)   
0.146 
 (-0.186,0.477)   
0.210*  
(-.0310,0.452)   
0.305 
(-.349,0.960)
30-40 years 
(Ref=  < 20 
years)
0.0798  
(-0.145,0.304)   
0.332 
(-0.0971,0.761)   
0.204
 (-0.0954,0.503) 
-0.0261
(-.811,0.759)
40+ years 
(Ref=   
< 20 years)
0.146  
(-0.147,0.438)   
0.164 
 (-0.399,0.727)   
0.103  
(-0.301,0.506)   
0.334 
(-.775,1.443)
Marital status 
Married (Ref= 
Unmarried)
0.0655 
(-0.0962,0.227) 
0.168 
(-0.147,0.484)   
0.203* 
(-.0266,0.432)   
-0.223
(-.861,0.415)
Others (Ref= 
Unmarried)
0.224
 (-0.157,0.606)  
-0.113
 (-0.790,0.564)   
0.347 
(-0.129,0.822)   
-0.953
(-.135,0.229)
Education
Secondary 
(Ref= Primary)
0.187** 
(0.0366,0.337)   
0.0323
 (-0.258,0.322)   
0.101 
(-0.1000,0.303)  
-0.0412
(-.566,0.483)
Higher second-
ary and above 
(Ref= Primary)
0.0196
 (-0.305,0.344)  
-0.197 
(-0.871,0.477)   
0.0639 
(-0.358,0.486)   
0.0805
(-.036,1.197)
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Job position
Supervisor/
Admin level 
worker (Ref= 
Other worker)
0.0374
 (-0.149,0.224)  
-0.302* 
(-0.656,0.0528)   
0.0825 
(-0.160,0.325)   
-0.160
(-.783,0.463)
Income logged income per month
-0.248***
 (-0.433, 
-.0628)
0.246
 (-0.111,0.603)   
0.203 
(-.0422,0.448)   
-0.0365
(-.742,0.669)
Chronic illness
Suffered chronic 
illness (Ref= 
Other illness)
1.657*** 
(1.024,2.290)   
0.699** 
(0.127,1.272)   
1.060*** 
(0.590,1.530)   
0.540
(-.306,1.386)
Inpatient care
Sought inpa-
tient care 
(Ref=Outpatient 
care)
- 1.717*** (1.160,2.274)   -
2.071***
(1.335,2.807)
Healthcare 
provider
Private 
(Ref=Public) -
-1.013***
 (-1.635, -0.390)
- -
Others 
(Ref=Public) -
-0.344
 (-1.172,0.484)   
- -
Constant
1.572*
(-0.0488,3.192)
4.360*** 
(1.155,7.566)
-3.253***
(-5.408, -0.097)
7.094** 
(0.880,13.31)
N  1924  658 1924 199
Pseudo R-square/ Adjusted 
R-square 0.070  0.099 0.07 0.119
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; a)MTPs= medically trained providers; Ref= Reference 
group
However, inpatient treatment and chronic disease were positively associated with 
OOP spending for accessing healthcare from all types of providers. Female workers 
spent less as an OOP compared to male workers. The supervisor / administrative 
workers paid less on healthcare than other workers. The inpatient treatment was 
positively associated with OOP spending for MTPs utilization. The characteristics of 
the RMG workers in insured and uninsured groups during pre-and post-intervention 
periods are presented in Appendix 9.
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6 DISCUSSION
The first study (Study I) provided an estimation of the impact of existing health-
care financing system on the financial risk of households in Bangladesh. Study II 
assessed the demand for CBHI scheme among informal workers in urban areas 
of Bangladesh. The Study III-V explored the possible solutions through estimating 
effect of health insurance scheme for mitigating challenges related to healthcare 
utilization from MTPs and the financial protection for accessing such care through 
CBHI and ESHI of households to achieve UHC. 
6.1 Main findings
The incidence of CHE was calculated at 24.6% based on total consumption expendi-
ture and 10.9% based on total non-food consumption expenditure, using two dif-
ferent definitions (section 4.1.1) in 2016. An earlier study of the year 2010 found 
the incidences of CHE at 14.2% and 9.7% respectively using the same definitions 
(Khan et al., 2017). It implies that the healthcare financing system in Bangladesh 
fostered 10.4% more CHE incidences in the last six years between 2010 and 2016. 
The drivers of the financial protection (CHE incidence and poverty due to OOP 
healthcare payments) in Bangladesh could be explained by the utilization of pri-
vate and public health facility, treatment for chronic condition, geographic locations 
reflected in the administrative divisions across the country as well the household 
characteristics (e.g., assets quintiles, household size, presence of children and 
elderly member, education level of the household head).
The investigation on the demand for CBHI, which had been recommended by the 
HCFS of Bangladesh to ensure financial protection of people in the informal sec-
tor of the economy, showed that a large share (86.7%) of informal workers was 
willing to pay. On average, the WTP was 22.8 BDT (0.286 USD) per household 
per week. The higher WTP was observed among rickshaw-pullers, workers with 
lower educational levels, higher income and those who live in a metropolitan city. 
An impact assessment of a pilot CBHI scheme demonstrated that the use of MTPs 
among the insured informal workers was higher over the previous three months 
relative to the matched uninsured group. Our analysis suggested that insured indi-
viduals were 2 times more likely to use MTPs. We further observed that, relative 
to the uninsured, OOP payments for health services utilization from MTPs were 
significantly lower (by 6.4%) for insured informal workers. However, the OOP pay-
ments were not significantly different between insured and uninsured for service 
utilization from all types of providers.
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Another health insurance scheme, sponsored by employers of the RMG workers 
(ESHI) demonstrated that the use of health services from the MTPs increased 18% 
among the insured (DiD = 18.4%, p<0.05). However, we observed no statistically 
significant impact on reducing OOP spending for health services utilization through 
that scheme.
6.2 Discussion of results
Study I: The high incidence of CHE in Bangladesh can be explained by the rising 
dependence on OOP expenditure. The Bangladesh National Health Accounts (BNHA) 
2015 reported an increase in the share of OOP expenses in total health expenditure 
from 60% to 67% between 2010 and 2015. During this time, the share of government 
spending in total health spending has been decreased from 26% to 23% (MoHFW, 
2018). The rise in OOP spending in Bangladesh might have an impact on the 
increased incidence of CHE between 2010 and 2016. However, we have observed 
that the data on OOP spending in HIES 2010 and 2016 were not fully comparable 
due to the difference in the survey tools. The BBS improved the health expenditure 
module of the HIES 2016 to collect more accurately OOP spending data for various 
healthcare services (e.g., primary healthcare, OPD, IPD and routine medication for 
chronic illness). In HIES 2010, questions related to OOP spending were not asked 
separately for these items like HIES 2016 (BBS, 2011, 2016). Therefore, caution 
should be taken for comparing the findings between these two years.
We found that the incidence of CHE was positively associated with having an elderly 
person in the household. The incidence of CHE was decreased with the increase 
of the household size. This might be because households with a high number of 
members might have a higher number of earners contributing to high total income 
or consumption expenditure. The households with at least one member who uti-
lized healthcare for chronic disease were 4.7 times more likely to face CHE than 
households without such utilization (95% CI: 4.4,4.9). Because of chronic disease, 
regular treatment, and prolonged hospitalization might have caused substantial 
OOP expenses and enhanced the chance of facing CHE.
Because of the high cost of treatment in private hospitals, utilization of this kind of 
facility became associated with a high incidence of CHE. The use of public facilities 
has also been associated significantly with the occurrence of high CHE though at a 
lower magnitude than the private facility utilization. CHE for public facility utilization 
can be explained by the stock-out of the necessary medication and other resources 
(e.g., diagnosis) in this kind of facilities which made people spend as OOP to pur-
chase additional healthcare from the private market (Mannan, 2013). However, the 
use of NGO services contributed to the reduction of the CHE incidences. In many 
cases, operations of NGO facilities are often funded by grants and donations and 
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such subsidy might have decreased OOP expenditure of the household (Sarwar, 
2015). In addition to their micro-credit scheme in Bangladesh, several NGOs 
(e.g., brac, Sajeda Foundation) provide micro-insurance that offers limited risk 
pooling among microcredit holders (Ahsan et al., 2013). NGO facilities, however, 
serve a smaller percentage of patients (0.61%) compared to private and public 
facilities in Bangladesh (BBS, 2014). Due to the dependency on donor support, 
the NGO facilities often suffer from sustainability risk (Sarwar, 2015). The poorest 
households experienced the highest percentage of CHE since this disadvantaged 
group had a lower capacity to spend, and any OOP expenditure constituted a high 
proportion of their total spending. Because of the inadequate publicly funded safety-
net scheme to cope with healthcare expenses for the poor, this segment of the 
population was more likely to face CHE (Rahaman and Choudhury, 2012; Haider 
and Mahamud, 2017). This finding was supported by the observation of Selden 
et al., 1993. Using the Grossman model, the authors showed that the poor people 
were  more prone to uncertainty of income due to illness, which led to increase in 
their health spending (Selden, 1993). 
The findings of this study were comparable to several previous studies in Bangladesh 
(Van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Rahman et al., 2013b; Hamid et al., 2014). Rahman 
et al., (2013) found that 9% of households faced CHE in a metropolitan city, and 
it was four-fold larger in the poorest households than the richest (Rahman et 
al., 2013b). In some other Asian countries, the incidence of CHE was higher for 
households with an elderly member who suffered from any chronic disease (Choi 
et al., 2015; Ghimire et al., 2018). The households with a member who suffered 
from chronic illnesses had incurred CHE in 15 high-income countries in Europe 
(Arsenijevic et al., 2016). Smaller households faced a higher incidence of CHE 
compared to the larger one (Adisa, 2015). It was observed that the incidence of 
CHE was higher in rural than in urban areas (Somkotra and Lagrada, 2008; Abu-
Zaineh et al., 2013). Though the magnitude of CHE incidences was high in the 
current investigation, the determinants of such incidences were generally in the 
same directions.
While study I investigated the condition of financial risk protection for healthcare in 
health system of  Bangladesh, this second study reflected the potential of introduc-
ing a pre-payment scheme (health insurance) as suggested by the HCFS to secure 
healthcare at affordable prices particularly for informal sector workers and their 
dependents  (MoHFW, 2012). Our study found that a high proportion of informal 
workers reported their WTP for CBHI. We further observed a significant positive 
association between monthly income and WTP for the CBHI scheme. More studies 
have confirmed this observation  (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; Dong et al., 2003; 
Dror et al., 2007; Ying et al., 2007; Shafie and Hassali, 2013). Such observations 
could be explained by higher ability-to-pay of the workers due to higher earnings 
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(Dong et al., 2003). Although we anticipated a positive association between level 
of education and WTP, on the contrary, it was found that education had a signifi-
cantly negative impact. A previous study in urban China found similar results to 
ours (Ying et al., 2007). In Bangladesh, understanding of health insurance was 
generally poor, especially among low-income people as observed in the very low 
share (2%) of health insurance in the total health spending (MoHFW, 2018). It 
was also found that WTP of the workers in the metropolitan city was significantly 
higher than those in district town and subdistrict area.  Other studies observed a 
similar association between WTP and geographical locations (Asgary et al., 2004; 
Dror et al., 2007; Onwujekwe et al., 2010; Binnendijk et al., 2013). Rickshaw-
pullers expressed higher WTP than the other occupational groups in the current 
study and disparity in WTP across occupational groups was observed elsewhere 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2009; Haile et al., 2014; Adams et al., 2015). The highest 
WTP of Rickshaw-puller can be understood by their income, e.g., they received 
cash income per working day and do not need to wait for weekly or monthly sala-
ries unlike shopkeepers and restaurant workers.
The GLM found that WTP (as a percentage of income) was more likely to decrease 
with increased income. This relationship followed the laws of the Engel, specifying 
that the proportion of income spent on food or other necessary items declines as 
income increases, while actual spending increases on those items (Perthel, 1975). 
This result suggested that health insurance was considered as an essential good 
by the informal workers. This was consistent with the results of Binnendijk et al., 
(2013), which found that the rural poor people in India regarded health insurance 
as a necessity (Binnendijk et al., 2013). The findings of GLM could be further 
explained by the von Neumann- Morgenstern risk-utility theorem (Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1953). Since the poor workers expect higher proportion of income-
loss compared to the better-of workers due to the informal nature of employment, 
they reported higher WTP (premium) for CBHI as the proportion of their income. 
The substantial demand for health insurance among informal workers (in study II) 
encourage the investigation of the effects of a CBHI scheme on their healthcare 
utilization from MTPs and related OOP payments. We found enrolment in the CBHI 
schemes contributed to increased use of MTPs and reduction of OOP payments 
for such use. No significant relationship between self-reported illness or symp-
toms and the insurance status of the individual was found in this study (Appendix 
10). However, due to ex-ante moral hazard i.e. consciously taking health-risk or 
reduce healthy activities like exercise by the insured (Jowett et al., 2004; Dave and 
Kaestner, 2009) and endogeneity issue, the effect of CBHI enrolment on health 
might not be clear. We found the utilization of MTPs significantly higher among mar-
ried household members (OR=0.371; 95% CI: 0.186-0.774) than unmarried ones, 
which might be due to more illness in the former group. Sultana et al., observed 
a supportive condition to our findings, meaning that the health-related quality of 
55
life (HRQoL) was higher among unmarried (HRQoL score =0.83) than the mar-
ried (HRQoL score =0.75) (Sultana et al., 2016). Other studies showed that the 
married were more likely to report an illness than unmarried and the utilization of 
healthcare facility was higher among them (Joung et al., 1995; Bourne, 2009). In 
line with Andersen healthcare utilization model, the Study II showed CBHI scheme 
as an enabling factor for MTP utilization (Andersen and Newman, 1973).
The lower OOP payments among insured for utilizing MTPs compared to uninsured 
can be explained by lower co-payment of enrollees due to their entitlement to the 
benefit package. On the contrary, the health services sought from non-trained pro-
viders were not covered by the benefit package of the insurances. Thus, the OOP 
payments for such services did not decrease. Since insurance scheme enrol-
ees used health services from other service providers than contracted ones (by the 
scheme), there was no significant decrease in OOP payments for health services 
while considered all types of providers. However, it should be mentioned here that 
the quality of healthcare is important to achieving UHC through safe, effective, 
people-centred and timely health service delivery (WHO, 2018). Contracting MTPs 
for service delivery by health insurance schemes is important to ensure the quality 
of care, which has been emphasized in this study. 
We found a significant relationship of some control variables with the predictor 
variables in addition to key variable of interest, i.e. insurance enrolment. Unmarried 
adults spent 5.7% less OOP than a married person spent on MTPs utilization. A 
similar relationship between marital status and OOP spending had been documented 
in a number of studies (Ekman, 2007; Chaudhuri and Roy, 2008; Mahumud et al., 
2017). Higher OOP payments among better-off informal workers (e.g., 2nd and 
the richest quintiles) compared to poor workers (e.g., the lowest quintile) could be 
explained by the ability of better-off workers to afford and use expensive private 
facilities which were not covered by the scheme (Khan et al., 2016; Rahman et al., 
2017; Ahmed et al., 2018b). A significant association between asset quintiles and 
OOP payments was found in a number of earlier studies in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) (Rahman et al., 2013b; Mahumud et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 
2018c). The worker, suffered from a chronic disease spent 8.2% higher OOP than 
a worker who suffered from a communicable disease due to high treatment costs 
for a chronic condition  (Rahman et al., 2013b).
Like the CBHI scheme, we observed higher utilization of MTPs among insured RMG 
workers though the OOP payments did not show any change. The non-significant 
effect of the ESHI scheme on reducing OOP expenditure could be explained by 
insured workers’ health-seeking behaviour. We found that a considerable proportion 
of insured workers continued to use health services on their own payments from for-
mal and informal providers (drug stores, traditional healers, etc.) out of the scheme. 
As a result, OOP payment remained similar among the insured RMG workers. 
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6.3 Discussion of methods
We used the latest survey data from HIES 2016 to estimate CHE incidences and 
economic impoverishment. In this round of the survey, the BBS detailed the health 
expenditure module, which provides a unique opportunity to more accurately esti-
mate these. The main limitation of the study is that it is based on cross-sectional 
data. Ideally, longitudinal data should be used to assess the causal effect of OOP 
spending on economic impoverishment of households (Sauerborn et al., 1996). 
Using cross-sectional data the point estimations could only be performed and con-
sequently, we could not determine what proportion of households faced persistent 
impoverishment. It might be possible that some of the households came out of 
catastrophic condition or poverty in a short time.
It should be remembered here that we used the asset quintiles to classify house-
holds into different socio-economic categories. In other studies, households were 
placed in socio-economic groups using alternative measurements such as house-
hold consumption expenditure. In this analysis, the use of asset quintiles to divide 
households into socio-economic categories could be backed by the arguments 
from O’Donnell et al., (2005). The authors observed the endogeneity problem while 
used both CHE estimate and total expenditure in the same econometric model 
(O’Donnell et al., 2005). Like Joglekar, using asset quintiles for socio-economic 
classification we avoided the endogeneity problem in this study (Joglekar, 2008). 
To measure the headcount of impoverishment, we used both national and inter-
national poverty lines. We prioritized the national poverty line-based estimate for 
interpretation as this reflects the local context and might be more useful to policy-
makers. However, the findings using the international poverty line would be useful 
for comparing with the findings from other countries. 
For estimating the WTP for CBHI among informal workers, we used the CVM 
method. In this method, the WTP estimate appeared to be influenced by starting 
bid (Kartman et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 2008). To address this problem, we 
used different starting bids (ranging from 10 BDT to 30 BDT) randomly among the 
participants (Drummond et al., 2008). These starting bids were determined by a pilot 
survey in a representative workers group. One limitation of this research was that 
the interviews were performed between December and April and therefore could 
not detect seasonality in informal workers’ wages. The use of multiple regression 
models considered workers of different income levels and could have addressed 
the issues of the effect of income variation on WTP. The fundamental issue in esti-
mating WTP in the context of developing countries was that low-income people 
might have not understood sufficiently the health insurance scheme mechanism 
and benefit package (Churchill, 2006; Bawa, 2011; Panda et al., 2015), which 
could affect the demand (WTP) for such product (Cole et al., 2013). We tested a 
benefit package from an existing health protection scheme (Public Health Center 
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in Dhaka and Savar) available for the low-income people in Bangladesh. Further, 
the trained interviewers described the product (CBHI scheme) in an understand-
able way using the local language. 
A weakness of the effect assessment of CBHI scheme was that since the survey 
took place from April to June 2014, we could not capture the seasonal variation in 
the use of healthcare and OOP payments. Some important variables (e.g. travel 
time and cost) were not considered in the regression model, which might have 
caused the differences in effects (MTP utilization and OOP payments) between the 
insured and uninsured groups. There was a possibility of recall bias, as data (e.g., 
health service utilization and OOP payments) was collected using a self-reported 
questionnaire. Earlier studies used recall periods of 1 to 12 months for collecting 
similar data (Ranson, 2001; Lu et al., 2009; Bose and Dutta, 2015). We used a 90 
day recall period to reduce the possibility of recall bias.
For assessing the effects of the ESHI scheme, it was not possible to interview the 
same workers in pre- and post-intervention periods because of the high dropout 
rate of the RMG workers. However, in the pre-and post-intervention period, the 
RMG workers were randomly selected from the list of employees for both IG and 
UG and no significant difference was found in the workers’ demographic character-
istics between these periods (Appendix 9). The implementation of the ESHI scheme 
for only one-year period might not be appropriate to evaluate the effects of such 
a scheme. However, applications of pre- and post-intervention design and DiD 
approach might have contributed positively to a better assessment of the effects, 
while many other studies in this research area did not consider important design-
ing issues. For instance, some studies did not consider the pre-intervention period 
in the analysis (Ranson, 2002; Dror et al., 2005; Gnawali et al., 2009; Wagstaff 
et al., 2009). This research, however, used a pre- and post-intervention design 
including intervention (insured) and comparison (uninsured) groups that provide 
an opportunity to obtain an estimation of DiD, which was regarded as a standard 
approach for assessing the effects of an intervention (Gertler et al., 2011). The self-
reported information about the illness, healthcare utilization, and OOP payments 
can be biased to some extent since the RMG workers might have poor knowledge 
about their medical conditions and the healthcare services (Chakraborty et al., 
2003; Bonfrer et al., 2014). However, we used a 90-day recall period in collecting 
information to minimize such biases.
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 Conclusions
Reliance on OOP payments as a mechanism for healthcare funding exposes many 
households to financial risk in Bangladesh. However, the informal workers who 
constitute the largest share of the working population in the country expressed 
demand for pre-payment mechanisms (health insurance) in line with the recom-
mendations made by international development partners and the government of 
Bangladesh. It was further shown that the health insurance schemes led to higher 
utilization of healthcare services from MTPs either at a lower (for CBHI) or the 
same (for ESHI) amount of OOP payments. In addition to our general conclusions 
from these investigations, it was observed that the demographics (e.g., marital 
status, household size) and socio-economic (e.g., asset status, educational level, 
occupation) characteristics, as well as geographic locations (e.g., administrative 
divisions), affected the relationships with main issues of interest (CHE incidence, 
impoverishment, WTP, MTP utilization and OOP payments) differently. Such varia-
tion should be considered while designing a healthcare financing system for ensur-
ing the financial protection of the people of Bangladesh or in countries with similar 
settings. The conclusions from this research addressed the three dimensions of 
UHC (population coverage, service coverage and financial risk protection), implying 
that more people get access to healthcare services they should get this at lower 
prices by joining the health insurance schemes. Additional financial resources 
for financing healthcare services could be generated through the premium of the 
informal workers and the RMG factory owners.   
7.2 Policy recommendations
Bangladesh’s healthcare financing should focus on finding alternatives to OOP 
funding to reduce the incidence of CHE and hence poverty. The study found key 
drivers of CHE and impoverishment, which suggests that some characteristics of 
the populations (married, elderly, and poor) were more prone to financial hard-
ship and therefore, the people with such characteristics should be brought under 
pre-payment schemes (e.g., insurance premium or tax-funded health safety-net). 
Besides the public health system, benefit packages should cover chronic diseases 
for reducing the dependency on OOP payment for treating this and reduce related 
CHE. Even the prevention of such diseases would be useful for averting the inci-
dence of CHE. The introduction of pre-payment schemes, along with strengthen-
ing the publicly funded health system, would reduce dependency on the high-cost 
private facilities (a strong determinant of financial hardship). Our studies observed 
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considerable demand for pre-payment schemes among the informal workers and 
therefore, such schemes can be recommended for implementation. However, cau-
tions should be taken while implementing such schemes since the demand varied 
across occupations, geographic locations, educational levels and income groups 
so that the schemes become affordable to the target populations. Implementation 
of CBHI and ESHI schemes can be recommended even since such schemes have 
the opportunity to employ or contract MTPs from both private and public health-
care sectors to ensure access of for the informal workers and factory workers to 
such formal care at a lower OOP payments (co-payment), which appeared to be 
a challenge in LMIC settings (Sudhinaraset et al., 2013). The benefit package and 
organizational structure of these schemes (CBHI and ESHI) should be designed 
carefully to cover the healthcare needs and address the health service provider 
choice of the beneficiaries as well as the financial sustainability so that these 
schemes can extend financial risk protection for healthcare access.
7.3 Future research
Only few studies in LMICs assessed the effect of health insurance schemes on 
increasing MTP utilization and reduction of financial risk among low-income people 
which have been addressed in this thesis. The demand-side of insurance schemes 
has been studied in this thesis at a large extent. However, further demand-side 
research can be conducted. For instance, non-health benefits (e.g. microcredit 
facility, skill training, discount shopping card, investment and savings opportunity) 
could be added as a parallel component of the CBHI schemes to make them attrac-
tive to the beneficiaries. Further research thus can be conducted to assess the 
effects of different combinations of benefits (health insurance alone and/or savings 
and/or micro-credit and/or subsidy on food purchase) on the enrolment and reten-
tion of the beneficiaries. Our studies mainly addressed the demand-side issues 
of these insurance schemes. There are large scope for conducting research in 
supply-side issues like, willingness of organized communities (cooperatives, trade-
union, micro-credit programs, labour associations) as well as employers of large 
factories (RMG and other) for organizing and funding CBHI and ESHI schemes 
need to be studied. Since the involvement of multiple actors is essential for suc-
cessful implementation of these schemes, a stakeholder analysis should be done 
to understand the mechanisms of engaging labour associations (or corresponding 
ones), owners’ associations, healthcare providers, development partners, govern-
ment organizations and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., buyers of RMG sector) 
for developing and scaling up the CBHI schemes for informal workers and ESHI 
schemes for formal workers.  
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The implementation challenges (scheme management, IT-use, interrelation among 
implementing actors, monitoring and evaluation, provider-payment mechanism, con-
tracts, claim management, etc.) and their possible solutions from both demand- and 
supply-side need to be investigated before scaling up the schemes. We would like 
to propose research on evaluating the financial sustainability and feasibility of the 
schemes while including value-for-money approaches and qualitative investigations. 
From the experience of CBHI and ESHI implementation, we found that at the initial 
stage these schemes required funding support for maintaining scheme activities 
which is difficult to cover through premium considering low number of enrolments 
at that period. Tax funding can be arranged to cover cost of the scheme targeting 
a self-financing plan until the scheme reaches the breakeven point where all costs 
can be covered by premium. Such initiatives should consider cost-containment and 
time frame for achieving financial sustainability. The contribution of taxes can even 
be made available while any such schemes face shortage of fund due to unforeseen 
events, like natural disasters, economic downturns. Further studies are required to 
estimate required amount of fund for initiating CBHI and ESHI schemes, possible 
mechanisms for leveraging the fund through tax and generating evidences about 
interest of government to invest in CBHI and ESHI schemes.  
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10 APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Characteristics of the sample of Household Income Expenditure Survey 2016
Variable
Percentage (95% CI)
N=45,977
Sex of household head
   Female 12.8 (12.4-13.1)
   Male 87.2 (86.9-87.6)
Education of household head
   No institutional education 42.1 (41.6-42.5)
   Up to primary 24.8 (24.4-25.2)
   Secondary 24.8 (24.4-25.2)
   Higher secondary 3.9 (3.8-4.1)
   University 4.4 (4.2-4.6)
Having child member in household
    No 28.0 (27.6-28.4)
   Yes 72.0 (71.6-72.4)
Having elderly member in household
    No 81.7 (81.4-82.1)
   Yes 18.3 (17.9-18.6)
Household size (equivalence scale)
   1-2 persons 14.3 (14.0-14.6)
   3-4 persons 52.5 (52.0-52.9)
   5 persons or more 33.2 (32.8-33.7)
At least one member seek care for chronic illness
    No 51.1 (50.7-51.6)
   Yes 48.9 (48.4-49.3)
At least one household member utilized inpatient service
    No 91.9 (91.7-92.2)
   Yes 8.1 (7.8-8.3)
At least one household member utilized of public facility
    No 87.2 (86.9-87.5)
   Yes 12.8 (12.5-13.1)
At least one household member utilized of private facility
    No 89.4 (89.1-89.7)
   Yes 10.6 (10.3-10.9)
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At least one household member utilized of NGO facility
    No 96.9 (96.8-97.1)
   Yes 3.1 (2.9-3.2)
At least one household member utilized of other providers
    No 61.2 (60.7-61.6)
   Yes 38.8 (38.4-39.3)
Location
  Urban 30.3 (29.9-30.8)
  Rural 69.7 (69.2-70.1)
Asset quintiles
  Poorest 20.0 (19.6-20.3)
  2nd 20.0 (19.6-20.4)
  3rd 20.0 (19.6-20.4)
  4th 20.0 (19.6-20.4)
  Richest 20.0 (19.6-20.4)
Appendix 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents before and after 
propensity score matching 
Characteristics
Before matching After matching
Insured Uninsured p-valuea Insured Uninsured p-valuea
% 
(95% CI)
%
(95% CI)
%
(95% CI)
%
(95% CI)
Age group 
  Child (0-14)
30.0
(28.5-31.5)
32.3
(30.6- 33.9)
0.091
29.6
(27.8- 31.4)
32.9
(31.1- 34.7)
0.039  Adult (15-60)
64.1
(62.5-65.6)
61.5
(59.8- 63.2)
64.2
(62.3- 66.0)
61.4
(59.5- 63.3)
  Elderly (60+)
5.9
(5.2- 6.7)
6.3
(5.4- 7.1)
6.3
(5.4- 7.3)
5.8
(4.9- 6.7)
Sex
  Male
48.0
(46.4-49.6)
49.6
(47.8- 51.3)
0.204
50.4
(48.4- 52.3)
48.2
(46.3- 50.2)
0.128
  Female
52.0
(50.4-53.6)
50.4
(48.7- 52.2)
49.6
(47.7- 51.6)
51.8
(49.8- 53.7)
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Marital status 
  Married
50.4
(48.7-52.0)
49.4
(47.6- 51.1)
0.211
49.5
(47.6- 51.5)
48.7
(46.8- 50.7)
0.461
  Unmarried
45.4
(43.8-47.0)
47.1
(45.3- 48.8)
46.4
(44.5- 48.4)
47.8
(45.8- 49.7)
  Others 
(Widowed, 
Divorced and 
Separated)
4.2
(3.5- 4.9)
3.6
(2.9- 4.2)
4.0
(3.3- 4.9)
3.5
(2.9- 4.3)
Occupation
  Agriculture 
worker
2.8
(2.2- 3.3)
3.1
(2.5- 3.7)
0.000
2.7
(2.2- 3.5)
2.4
(1.9- 3.1)
0.742
  Labor
7.3
(6.4- 8.1)
6.1
(5.2- 6.9)
7.5
(6.6- 8.6)
6.6
(5.6- 7.6)
  Sales worker
4.4
(3.7- 5.1)
6.3
(5.5- 7.2)
5.2
(4.4- 6.2)
5.5
(4.7- 6.4)
  Service 
worker
5.5
(4.7- 6.2)
7.0
(6.1- 7.9)
6.6
(5.7- 7.7)
6.1
(5.2- 7.1)
  Housewife
23.4
(22.1- 24.8)
23.0
(21.6- 24.5)
22.9
(21.3- 24.6)
23.2
(21.6- 24.9)
  Transport 
worker
3.2
(2.6- 3.7)
3.5
(2.9- 4.2)
3.5
(2.9- 4.3)
3.3
(2.7- 4.1)
  Small 
business
2.0
(1.5- 2.5)
2.2
(1.7- 2.7)
2.1
(1.6- 2.8)
2.2
(1.7- 2.9)
  Not working/ 
unemployed
48.3
(46.7-50.0)
47.6
(45.8- 49.3)
47.3
(45.4- 49.3)
49.1
(47.2- 51.1)
  Others
3.1
(2.6- 3.7)
1.3
(0.9- 1.7)
1.9
(1.5- 2.6)
1.5
(1.1- 2.1)
Household size
   1-2 persons
3.4
(2.8- 3.9)
9.0
(8.0- 10.0)
<0.000
4.7
(3.9- 5.6)
4.3
(3.6- 5.2)
0.649   3-4 persons
34.0
(32.4- 35.5)
49.7
(47.9- 51.4)
45.3
(43.3- 47.2)
44.5
(42.5- 46.4)
   5 persons or 
more
62.7
(61.1- 64.2)
41.3
(39.6- 43.0)
50.1
(48.1- 52.0)
51.2
(49.3- 53.2)
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Education level
  No institutional 
education
20.8
(19.4-22.1)
21.3
(19.8- 22.7)
0.09
21.2
(19.6- 22.8)
21.9
(20.3- 23.5)
0.199
  Primary level 
( years 1-5)
38.6
(37.0-40.2)
38.9
(37.2- 40.6)
35.1
(33.3- 37.0)
37.4
(35.6- 39.3)
  Junior  level 
( years 6-8)
23.6
(22.2-25.0)
22.3
(20.8- 23.7)
25.9
(24.2- 27.7)
22.9
(21.3- 24.6)
  Secondary 
level 
( years 9-10)
11.3
(10.3-12.4)
12.0
(10.8- 13.1)
12.5
(11.3- 13.9)
12.4
(11.2- 13.8)
  Higher 
Secondary 
level 
( years 11-12)
4.3
(3.7- 5.0)
3.6
(2.9- 4.2)
3.6
(2.9- 4.4)
3.9
(3.2- 4.7)
  Tertiary level 
(12+)
1.4
(1.0- 1.7)
2.1
(1.6- 2.6)
1.7
(1.2- 2.2)
1.5
(1.1- 2.0)
Location
  Urban
33.9
(32.3-35.4)
33.0
(31.3- 34.6)
0.43
35.1
(33.2- 36.9)
34.0
(32.2- 35.9)
0.441
  Rural
66.1
(64.6-67.7)
67.0
(65.4- 68.7)
64.9
(63.1- 66.8)
66.0
(64.1- 67.8)
Asset quintiles
  Poorest
18.0
(16.7-19.3)
21.3
(19.9- 22.8)
0.00
18.9
(17.4- 20.4)
17.9
(16.5- 19.5)
0.166
  2nd
16.2
(15.0-17.4)
22.7
(21.3- 24.2)
20.2
(18.7- 21.9)
19.7
(18.2- 21.3)
  3rd
19.6
(18.3-20.9)
19.7
(18.3- 21.1)
19.6
(18.1- 21.2)
20.9
(19.4- 22.6)
  4th
24.0
(22.6-25.4)
16.9
(15.6- 18.2)
17.9
(16.5- 19.5)
19.9
(18.4- 21.5)
  Richest
22.2
(20.8-23.6)
19.4
(18.0- 20.8)
23.4
(21.8- 25.1)
21.6
(20.0- 23.2)
N 3,548 3,146 2,519 2,519 -
aChi-square test
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Appendix 3. Characteristics of respondents and household before and after propen-
sity score matching using out-of-pocket payments as outcome
Before matching After matching
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured
Characteristics
% 
(95% CI)
%
(95% CI)
p-value*)
%
(95% CI)
%
(95% CI)
p-value*)
N 3,548 3,146 2,502 2,502
Age group 
  Child (0-14)
30.0
(28.5-31.5)
32.3
(30.6- 33.9)
29.5 
(27.7 - 31.3)
32.9 
(31.1 - 34.7)
  Adult (15-60)
64.1
(62.5-65.6)
61.5
(59.8- 63.2)
0.091
63.6 
(61.7 - 65.5)
61.4 
(59.5 - 63.3)
0.018
  Elderly (60+)
5.9
(5.2- 6.7)
6.3
(5.4- 7.1)
6.8 
(5.8 - 7.8)
5.7 
(4.8 - 6.6)
Sex
  Male
48.0
(46.4-49.6)
49.6
(47.8- 51.3)
0.204
50.3 
(48.3 - 52.2)
48.4 
(46.4 - 50.4)
0.184
  Female
52.0
(50.4-53.6)
50.4
(48.7- 52.2)
49.7 
(47.8 - 51.7)
51.6 
(49.6 - 53.6)
Marital status
  Married
50.4
(48.7-52.0)
49.4
(47.6- 51.1)
0.211
49.9 
(47.9 - 51.8)
48.7 
(46.8 - 50.7)
0.057
  Unmarried
45.4
(43.8-47.0)
47.1
(45.3- 48.8)
45.6 
(43.7 - 47.6)
47.9 
(46.0 - 49.9)
  Others 
(Widowed, 
Divorced and 
Separated)
4.2
(3.5- 4.9)
3.6
(2.9- 4.2) 4.5 
(3.7 - 5.3)
3.4 
(2.7 - 4.1)
Occupation
  Agriculture 
worker
2.8
(2.2- 3.3)
3.1
(2.5- 3.7)
2.7 
(2.0 - 3.3)
2.6 
(1.9 - 3.2)
  Labor
7.3
(6.4- 8.1)
6.1
(5.2- 6.9)
0.001
6.4 
(5.4 - 7.4)
6.5 
(5.5 - 7.4)
0.408
  Sales worker
4.4
(3.7- 5.1)
6.3
(5.5- 7.2)
5.4 
(4.5 - 6.2)
5.2 
(4.3 - 6.1)
  Service worker
5.5
(4.7- 6.2)
7.0
(6.1- 7.9)
7.1 
(6.1 - 8.1)
6.1 
(5.1 - 7.0)
  Housewife
23.4
(22.1- 
24.8)
23.0
(21.6- 24.5)
21.7 
(20.1 - 23.4)
23.3 
(21.6 - 24.9)
  Transport 
worker
3.2
(2.6- 3.7)
3.5
(2.9- 4.2)
4.0 
(3.3 - 4.8)
3.4 
(2.7 - 4.1)
  Small business
2.0
(1.5- 2.5)
2.2
(1.7- 2.7)
2.3 
(1.7 - 2.9)
2.1 
(1.6 - 2.7)
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  Not working or 
unemployed
48.3
(46.7-50.0)
47.6
(45.8- 49.3)
48.2 
(46.3 - 50.2)
49.4 
(47.5 - 51.4)
  Others
3.1
(2.6- 3.7)
1.3
(0.9- 1.7)
2.2 
(1.6 - 2.7)
1.5 
(1.0 - 2.0)
Household size
3 persons or 
less
3.4
(2.8- 3.9)
9.0
(8.0- 10.0)
4.8 
(3.9 - 5.6)
4.4 
(3.6 - 5.2)
4-5 persons
34.0
(32.4 
- 35.5)
49.7
(47.9- 51.4)
0.001 45.8 
(43.9 - 47.8)
44.4 
(42.5 - 46.4)
0.410
6 persons or 
more
62.7
(61.1- 
64.2)
41.3
(39.6- 43.0)
49.4 
(47.5 - 51.4)
51.2 
(49.3 - 53.2)
Years of schooling group
  No institutional 
education
20.8
(19.4-22.1)
21.3
(19.8- 22.7)
21.4 
(19.8 - 23.0)
21.9 
(20.3 - 23.5)
  Primary level 
(years 1-5)
38.6
(37.0-40.2)
38.9
(37.2- 40.6)
0.090
36.1 
(34.2 - 38.0)
37.6 
(35.8 - 39.5)
0.632
  Junior level 
(years 6-8)
23.6
(22.2-25.0)
22.3
(20.8- 23.7)
24.6 
(22.9 - 26.3)
23.3 
(21.6 - 25.0)
  Secondary 
level 
(years 9-10)
11.3
(10.3-12.4)
12.0
(10.8- 13.1)
11.9 
(10.6 - 13.1)
12.0 
(10.7 - 13.2)
  Higher 
Secondary level 
(years 11-12)
4.3
(3.7- 5.0)
3.6
(2.9- 4.2)
4.2 
(3.4 - 4.9)
3.7 
(3.0 - 4.5)  
  Tertiary level 
(12+)
1.4
(1.0- 1.7)
2.1
(1.6- 2.6)
1.8 
(1.3 - 2.4)
1.5 
(1.0 - 2.0)  
Location
  Urban
33.9
(32.3-35.4)
33.0
(31.3- 34.6)
0.430
35.4 
(33.5 - 37.3)
34.4 
(32.6 - 36.3)
0.458
  Rural
66.1
(64.6-67.7)
67.0
(65.4- 68.7)
64.6 
(62.7 - 66.5)
65.6 
(63.7 - 67.4)
Asset quintiles
  Poorest
18.0
(16.7-19.3)
21.3
(19.9- 22.8)
19.2 
(17.6 - 20.7)
18.3 
(16.8 - 19.8)
  2nd
16.2
(15.0-17.4)
22.7
(21.3- 24.2)
0.001
20.2 
(18.6 - 21.8)
19.6 
(18.0 - 21.1)
0.785
  3rd
19.6
(18.3-20.9)
19.7
(18.3- 21.1)
19.9 
(18.3 - 21.4)
21.1 
(19.5 - 22.7)
  4th
24.0
(22.6-25.4)
16.9
(15.6- 18.2)
19.1 
(17.5 - 20.6)
19.5 
(17.9 - 21.0)
  Richest
22.2
(20.8-23.6)
19.4
(18.0- 20.8)
21.7 
(20.1 - 23.3)
21.6 
(20.0 - 23.2)
*) Chi-square test
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Appendix 4. Respondent and household characteristics
Variables Rickshaw-
puller
Shop-keeper Restaurant 
worker 
Difference across 
occupational 
group (p-value)
Total
Age 32.9                      27.3   31.1 0.028 30.4
Sex (Male %) 99.5    98.5 87.6 0.000 95.3
Marital status (Married %) 82.8 37.8 64.6 0.012 61.4
Household size 4.6 5.5 4.8 0.072 5.0
Educational level
     Less than one year (%) 72 11 44 0.092 42
     Up to primary (%) 23 33 36 0.073 30
     More than primary (%) 5 56 20 0.051 28
Monthly income of the 
worker (BDT) 7,696.5 5,870.4 5,617.0 0.011 6,399.2
Household income per 
equivalent adult (BDT) 3,256.6 5,015.9 3,037.9 0.004 3,839.1
Household expenditure per 
equivalent adult (BDT) 2,948.7 3,473.6 2,328.3 0.998 2,965.2
Location 
      Metropolitan city (%) 33.3 32.1 33.7 33.0
      District (%) 34.4 36.2 34.2 35.0
      Sub-district (%) 32.2 31.6 32.0 31.9
Observations 186 193 178 557
Appendix 5. Association of respondent characteristics with proportion of WTP and 
income for health insurance coverage from a GLM regression analysis
Variables Description Odds ratio (95% CI)
Age In years 0.99 (0.98-1.01)
Sex Female (Ref = male) 0.83 (0.5-1.37)
Marital status Unmarried (ref = married) 1.08 (0.83-1.39)
Others (ref = married) 1.25 (0.65-2.42)
Household size Number of household members 0.99 (0.96-1.04)
Educational level Up to primary level (ref = less than one year) 0.66*** (0.52-0.85)
More than primary level (ref = less than one year) 0.98 (0.71-1.37)
Monthly income Logged income per month 0.46*** (0.34-0.61)
Illness in last 6 months Illness of respondent or any household member 1.07 (0.71-1.61)
Location Sub-district (ref= Metropolitan city) 1.25 (0.94-1.65)
District (ref= Metropolitan city) 0.59*** (0.48-0.73)
Occupation Shop worker (ref= Rickshaw-puller) 0.64** (0.45-0.9)
Restaurant workers (ref= Rickshaw-puller) 0.75 (0.49-1.17)
Constant 25.25*** (2.28-279.84)
N  326
Note: ***and ** denote p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively
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Appendix 6. Propensity score matching results on average insurance effect 
(ATE) on OOP payment for seeking healthcare
Outcome variables Observed coefficient (ATE)
Robust standard 
error p-value
OOP payment for seeking care 
from any provider -311.9 218.9 0.154 
OOP payment for seeking care 
from a medically trained provider -1271.3 679.8  0.061
Appendix 7. Inverse probability weighting results on average insurance effect (ATE) 
on OOP payment for seeking healthcare
Outcome variables Estimation type N
Observed 
coefficient 
Robust stand-
ard error p-value
OOP payment for seeking 
care from any provider 
ATE 2,094 -353.6 252.2 0.161
POmean 2,094 2,690.6 215.8 0.000
OOP payment for seek-
ing care from medically 
trained provider
ATE 912 -1,210.3 555.7 0.029
POmean 912 5,305.5 467.6 0.000
Appendix 8. Estimated effect of CBHI scheme enrolment (individuals) on OOP 
payments (natural logged) using Tobit model for seeking healthcare from medically 
trained providers and from any healthcare providers
Variables Description
Dependent=OOP for 
utilizing medically 
trained providers
Dependent=OOP for 
 utilizing any providers
Coefficient (95% CI) Coefficient (95% CI)
Health insur-
ance status
Member (Ref=No 
membership) -0.408*** (-0.593,-0.223) -0.053 (-0.174,0.068)   
Age-group Adult,15-60years (Ref=Child,0-14years) 0.154 (-0.269,0.578)   0.039 (-0.223,0.302)   
Elderly,60+ 
(Ref=Child,0-14years) 0.102 (-0.444,0.649)   -0.119 (-0.463,0.226)   
Sex Female (Ref=Male) -0.181 (-0.486,0.123)   -0.073 (-0.252,0.106)   
Marital status Unmarried (Ref=Married) -0.411** (-0.788,-0.0342) -0.505*** (-0.756,-0.255)
Widowed/divorced 
(Ref=Married) 0.064 (-0.408,0.536)   -0.022 (-0.340,0.296)   
Occupation Labor (Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.028 (-0.674,0.618)   -0.155 (-0.554,0.243)   
Sales worker 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.530* (-1.158,0.099)   -0.132 (-0.542,0.277)   
Service worker 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.242 (-0.919,0.434)   -0.363 (-0.797,0.071)   
Housewife 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.195 (-0.802,0.413)   -0.114 (-0.485,0.257)   
82
Transport worker 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.776** (-1.504,-0.048) -0.527** (-0.983,-0.071)
Small business 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.380 (-1.069,0.310)   -0.197 (-0.679,0.286)   
Not working/unemployed 
(Ref=Agriculture worker) -0.359 (-0.958,0.239)   -0.185 (-0.564,0.193)   
Others (Ref=Agriculture 
worker) -0.144 (-1.103,0.815)   -0.706*** (-1.224,-0.187)
Household 
size
4-5 persons (Ref=<=3 
persons) -0.069 (-0.492,0.352)   -0.085 (-0.360,0.190)   
=>6 persons (Ref=<=3 
persons) -0.226 (-0.649,0.198)   -0.193 (-0.466,0.080)   
Education Primary level (Ref=No institutional education) -0.139 (-0.404,0.126)   -0.054 (-0.220,0.112)   
Junior level (Ref=No insti-
tutional education) 0.064 (-0.240,0.368)   -0.032 (-0.233,0.169)   
Secondary level (Ref=No 
institutional education) 0.035 (-0.345,0.415)   0.146 (-0.115,0.407)   
Higher secondary level 
(Ref=No institutional 
education) -0.142 (-0.681,0.397)   -0.048 (-0.426,0.331)   
Tertiary level and other 
(Ref=No institutional 
education) -0.323 (-0.953,0.306)   -0.069 (-0.551,0.414)   
Asset 
quintiles 2nd (Ref=Poorest) 0.378** (0.0433,0.712)   0.0115 (-0.182,0.205)   
3rd (Ref=Poorest) 0.233 (-0.0823,0.548)   0.128 (-0.064,0.321)   
4th (Ref=Poorest) 0.373** (0.0504,0.695)   0.209** (0.010,0.408)   
Richest (Ref=Poorest) 0.541*** (0.230,0.852)   0.453*** (0.252,0.653)   
Location Urban (Ref=Rural) -0.031 (-0.233,0.171)   -0.045 (-0.182,0.091)   
Illness or 
symptoms 
suffered
Non-communicable dis-
eases (Ref=communicable 
diseases) 0.556*** (0.198,0.914)   0.788*** (0.549,1.026)   
Accident and Injuries 
(Ref=communicable 
diseases) 0.469* (-0.0266,0.964)   0.721*** (0.338,1.105)   
Problem and delivery 
care (Ref=communicable 
diseases) 0.488* (-0.0852,1.061)   0.801*** (0.349,1.253)   
Symptoms 
(Ref=communicable 
diseases) 0.0472 (-0.271,0.365)   -0.0760 (-0.264,0.112)   
Others (Ref=communicable 
diseases) 0.722*** (0.395,1.049)   0.921*** (0.692,1.151)   
Inpatient care 
utilized Yes(Ref=No) 1.136*** (0.837,1.436)   1.328*** (1.068,1.587)   
Constant  7.865*** (6.988,8.743)   7.048*** (6.509,7.586)   
N 706 1,570
LRchi2(32) 174.7 464.2
Prob. >chi2 0.000 0.000
PseudoR2 0.070 0.084
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Appendix 9. Characteristics of the Ready-Made Garments worker 
Characteristics
 Pre-intervention Post-intervention
Insured (IG) Uninsured (UG) Insured (IG) Uninsured (UG)
% (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Age group
< 20 years 23.1 (19.3 - 26.9)
21.8 
(18.1 -25.5)
11.3 
(8.4 - 14.1)
18.8 
(15.3 -22.3)
  20-30  years 49.2 (44.7 - 53.6)
62.2 
(57.9 -66.6)
54.1 
(49.6 -58.5)
58.0 
(53.6 - 62.5)
  30-40 years 18.5 (15.1 - 22.0)
12.0 
(9.1 - 14.9)
26.5 
(22.6 - 0.5)
18.2 
(14.7 - 1.6)
  40+ years 9.2 (6.6 - 11.8)
3.9 
(2.2 - 5.7)
8.1 
(5.7 - 10.6)
5.0 
(3.1 - 7.0)
Sex
  Male 40.6 (36.2 - 45.0)
52.5 
(48.0 - 57.0)
31.3 
(27.2 - 35.5)
47.8 
(43.3 -52.3)
  Female 59.4  (55.0 - 63.8)
47.5 
(43.0 - 52.0)
68.7 
(64.5 - 72.8)
52.2 
(47.7 -56.7)
Marital status 
   Married 69.0 (64.8 - 73.1)
73.2 
(69.3 - 77.2)
78.5 
(74.8 - 82.2)
75.4 
(71.5 - 79.2)
Unmarried 27.1 (23.1 - 31.1)
24.5 
(20.6 - 28.3)
18.4 
 (14.9 - 21.8)
22.8 
(19.0 - 26.5)
Others (Widowed, 
Divorced and 
Separated)
4.0(2.2 - 5.7)
2.3
(0.9 - 3.6)
3.1
(1.6 - 4.7)
1.9
(0.7 - 3.1)
Job position
Worker 87.7 (84.8 - 90.6)
85.1 
(81.9 - 88.2)
78.7 
 (75.0 - 82.4)
83.1 
(79.7 - 86.5)
Supervisor/admin 
levelworker
12.3 
(9.4 - 15.2)
14.9 
(11.8 - 18.1)
21.3 
(17.6 - 25.0)
16.9 
(13.5 - 20.3)
Household size
  3 persons or less 69.8 (65.7 - 73.9)
75.5 
(71.7 - 79.4)
70.6 
(66.5 - 74.6)
76.0 
(72.2 - 79.8)
  4-5 persons 25.4 (21.5 - 29.3)
22.2 
(18.5 - 25.9)
22.3 
(18.6 - 26.1)
20.0 
(16.5 - 23.6)
  6 persons or 
more
4.8 
(2.9 - 6.7)
2.3 
(0.9 - 3.6)
7.1 
(4.8 - 9.4)
4.0 
(2.2 - 5.7)
Level of education
Primary level ( 
years 1-5)
67.5 
(63.3 - 71.7)
62.9 
(58.5 - 67.2)
59.7 
(55.3 -64.1)
62.4 
(58.1 - 66.8)
Secondary level ( 
years 9-10)
28.3 
(24.3 - 32.4)
33.6 
(29.4 - 37.8)
34.9 
(30.6 - 39.1)
33.6 
(29.4 - 37.8)
Higher Secondary 
level and 
above ( years 11+)
4.2
(2.4 - 6.0)
3.5
(1.9 - 5.2)
5.4
(3.4 - 7.5)
4.0
(2.2 - 5.7)
Mean income 
per-month
7,945 
(7,606 – 8,284)
9,140 
(8,737 – 9,542)
12,945 
(12,310 
– 13,580)
11,298
(10,884 – 11,711)
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Appendix 10. Association between self-reported illness or symptoms and individu-
als’ health insurance status
Characteristics  Description
Dependent variable 
= Self-reported ill-
ness or symptoms 
(1= reported any ill-
ness or symptoms, 0= 
reported none) 
Health insurance status Member (Ref= No membership) 1.109(0.982,1.252)
Age-group
Adult, 15-60 years (Ref= Child, 0-14 years) 0.700**(0.550,0.891)
Elderly, 60+ (Ref= Child, 0-14 years) 0.739(0.524,1.042)
Sex Female (Ref= Male) 1.111(0.935,1.320)
Marital status 
Unmarried (Ref=Married) 0.475***(0.378,0.597)
Widowed/divorced (Ref=Married) 0.884(0.622,1.258)
Occupation
Labor (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.523**(0.341,0.802)
Sales worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.627*(0.403,0.977)
Service worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.397***(0.252,0.625)
Housewife (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.824(0.548,1.238)
Transport worker (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.625(0.387,1.010)
Small business (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.663(0.389,1.130)
Not working/unemployed (Ref= Agriculture 
worker) 0.646*(0.427,0.978)
Others (Ref= Agriculture worker) 0.739(0.417,1.309)
Education
Primary level (Ref= No institutional education) 0.817*(0.692,0.966)
Junior  level  (Ref= No institutional education) 0.627***(0.516,0.761)
Secondary level  (Ref= No institutional 
education) 0.577***(0.453,0.737)
Higher Secondary level  (Ref= No institutional 
education) 0.922(0.633,1.344)
Tertiary level and other  (Ref= No institutional 
education) 0.769(0.452,1.310)
Income quintiles
2nd (Ref=Poorest) 0.914(0.753,1.111)
3rd (Ref=Poorest) 0.963(0.793,1.170)
4th (Ref=Poorest) 1.007(0.824,1.231)
Richest (Ref=Poorest) 0.857(0.702,1.046)
Household size
4-5 persons (Ref= <=3 persons) 0.756(0.566,1.009)
=>6 persons (Ref= <=3 persons) 0.809(0.606,1.080)
Location Urban (Ref=Rural) 1.474***(1.288,1.687)
Constant 1.375(0.793,2.383)
N 5,038
LR chi2(32) 241.5
Prob > chi2  0.000
